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STATUTES AND RULES 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a trust probate action commenced on May 26, 2005, by the 
Attorneys General of Utah and Arizona alleging breach of fiduciary duties by the trustees 
of the Trust. After the trustees defaulted, the Third Judicial District Court ("Court" or 
"District Court") granted certain relief requested in the petition - suspending the trustees 
and appointing Bruce R. Wisan (the "Fiduciary") to serve as a special fiduciary for the 
Trust. On October 25, 2006, the Court reformed the declaration of trust and executed an 
order certifying the reformation as final under Rule 54(b). Appellants have never appealed 
the reformation order. Appellants did not appear in the trust probate case until August, 
2008, when they began filing a number of motions in the trust probate case. On November 
10, 2008, the Court entered an Order that Appellants have no legal standing in the trust 
probate case. Appellants did not appeal the Court's ruling as to lack of standing. Six 
months later, on May 13 and 21, 2009, Appellants filed the present motions to intervene. 
The motions were denied by the Court on July 17,2009,1 and the present appeal followed. 
1
 See Corrected Ruling and Order on Pending Motions, dated July 17,2009, at pp. 1-2 
(R. 16381) (copy included in addendum). In such Order, the Court reaffirmed its prior 
rulings on standing, which includes the Court's Decision and Order, dated Nov. 10,2008 (R. 
14063) (copy included in addendum). The Court also relied upon and incorporated by 
reference the analysis of the Arizona Attorney General in its Memorandum, dated June 5, 
2009 (R. 15604) (copy included in addendum). 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellants present a misleading and false account of the facts to create a false picture 
of what really transpired in this case. Warren Jeffs and his followers, including the former 
trustees, members of the FLDS Church, and the present Appellants (collectively, the "Jeffs 
Adherents") created a legal mess in 2004 and 2005 when they abandoned the Trust and left 
its assets at risk of loss - thereby endangering the homes of thousands of people. They then 
dumped such mess into the laps of the Attorneys General, the Court, and the Fiduciary. In 
abandoning the Trust, Warren Jeffs knew that government officials would be legally 
obliged to protect the assets of the Trust. Indeed, this was Jeffs' intent and purpose in 
abandoning the Trust. Jeffs believed that by inducing governmental intervention with the 
Trust he was "fulfilling the directive of the Lord" that his people be "driven" from Trust 
lands. (R. 19598). Jeffs desired such outcome so that he and a few elite could go to Texas 
to practice underage marriage, while leaving homeless many other followers who were 
deemed less worthy. 
Thus, Jeffs made the Attorneys General, the Court, and the Fiduciary his tools to 
accomplish his desire for governmental intervention with the Trust. 
With the assets of the charitable Trust at risk, the Attorneys General were under a legal 
duty to step in to protect the Trust from the malfeasance of its trustees. Acting in 
accordance with the law, the Attorneys General brought the matter to the District Court and 
obtained the appointment of the Special Fiduciary to administer the Trust. In turn, the 
District Court and Fiduciary both acted in good faith to clean up the mess - to administer 
the Trust and to protect its assets in accordance with the law. Over the past five years, the 
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Fiduciary has successfully protected the assets of the Trust and saved the homes of the 
people, while also recovering additional assets valued far in excess of the total amount of 
the Trust's costs during such time period. 
The record reflects that, contrary to Appellants5 false accusations, the Fiduciary and 
the Court were not discriminatory against the FLDS people. Rather, they reached out to the 
FLDS people and treated them with fairness and respect. Indeed, Warren Jeffs admits that 
he received favorable reports from his followers: "the woman judge and this man named 
Wisan . . . want[] to be friendly toward our people"; and "our people feel like [the 
Fiduciary] and this judge will be kind and allow us our rights and protect us." (R. 19596). 
Unfortunately, Jeffs put a quick stop to such thinking. Using vile racist imagery, Jeffs told 
his followers that the Fiduciary and the Court were "of the devil" and that their friendliness 
was "flattery." (Id) Jeffs assured that his followers would not communicate, cooperate, or 
participate in the legal process by telling them that they must "answer them nothing" or else 
face religious condemnation. (Id.) 
Thus began a war of hostility by the Jeffs Adherents against the Fiduciary and the 
Court. For more than three years, the war was waged from the underground. Then, when 
Warren Jeffs' hopes and plans for an underage marriage haven in Texas did not work out 
as he anticipated, Jeffs effectuated a drastic change in strategy by issuing new litigation 
instructions to a few of his followers. (R. 19571). In 2008, Appellants and a few other 
Jeffs Adherents responded to their new instructions by emerging from the underground and 
commencing a full-scale litigation assault on the Trust. They engaged the services of eight 
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different law firms to overwhelm the Trust with an avalanche of litigation and to starve it 
of the funds needed for its survival. 
Having used the Fiduciary to defend the Trust from the Tort Lawsuits, and having had 
the assets of the Trust preserved thereby, Appellants suddenly claimed to have individual 
rights in the property and sought to usurp control over the Trust. In so doing, the Jeffs 
Adherents did not explain or apologize for their multi-year refusal to participate in the 
reformation process.2 Neither did they acknowledge the actions of the Court and the 
Fiduciary in preserving the Trust. In pursuing their litigation war, Appellants have not 
disclosed that they are acting at the bidding of Warren Jeffs, but have alleged that they are 
appearing as individuals who had a special interest in the property of the Trust. Such 
allegations are belied by the fact that they have opposed all efforts to convey Trust property 
to the individual residents, and instead seek to place it all under FLDS leadership control. 
Now, Appellants seek to expand their assault again by attempting formally to 
intervene as parties in the Trust Probate Action. They seek intervention so that they can file 
even more legal attacks as they seek to usurp control over the Trust and overwhelm it with 
vexatious litigation. 
2 
It was only when this Court questioned counsel for Appellants at the February 17, 2010 
hearing in Case NO. 20090859 that any explanation was publicly provided: 
.. .the answer to that question lies inside the religious box. That. . . there was a 
religious decision being made. It was a test of faith and . . . it came to a point 
where the people determined that the test of faith was over and they needed to 
move forward and try to protect this property . . . themselves. 
Court recording: Oral Argument before the Utah Supreme Court in FLDS v. Lindberg, 
No. 20090859-SC, (Feb. 17, 2010) available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon::::20102 (session I 22:42-
25:08) (last visited July 3, 2010). 
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This Court should not be misled by Appellants' revisionist history. If the true and 
complete facts are known, it is readily apparent that Appellants are not entitled to intervene, 
and the appeal should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I. Historical Background of the UEP Trust (1942 to 2004) 
A. The UEP Trust 
1. The United Effort Plan Trust (the "Trust" or "UEP Trust") is a Utah trust created in 
1942 pursuant to a DECLARATION OF TRUST, dated November 9,1942 (the "Original 
Trust Declaration") by certain members of a religious movement. (R. 1, at Exhibit "B"). 
2. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Trust engaged in extensive litigation with a number of 
people who were residing in houses built upon Trust land. Such litigation primarily 
involved the question whether the trustees of the Trust were permitted to evict people 
residing upon Trust property who had fallen into disfavor with the trustees, and, if so, 
whether the Trust was required to compensate evicted persons for the value of the 
improvements which they constructed upon Trust property.3 In 1998, this Court issued an 
opinion in the UEP Trust litigation, wherein the Court determined, among other things, that 
the Trust was.a private trust. {See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998)). 
3. Shortly after this Court issued its opinion, Rulon Jeffs, the sole surviving settlor of 
the Trust, executed an AMENDED AND RESTATED DECLARATION OF TRUST OF 
3Through the years, numerous people donated land to the Trust and/or constructed 
housing and improvements upon the Trust's land. Today, the property of the Trust consists 
almost entirely of land and improvements. The Trust owns approximately 5,000 acres of 
property with over 700 homes located in Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona, an area 
known as Short Creek, as well as in British Columbia, Canada. (R. 3037-3039, 3070). 
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THE UNITED EFFORT PLAN TRUST, dated November 3, 1998 (the "Restated Trust 
Declaration"), which replaced the Original Trust Declaration. (R. 21). 
4. The Restated Trust Declaration, among other things, converted the Trust to a 
charitable trust with two purposes: (i) promoting the doctrines and goals of the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "FLDS Church"); and (ii) 
providing for the just wants and needs of FLDS members.4 (R. 22-23). 
5. The Restated Trust Declaration further provided that donations to the Trust were 
unconditional, that improvements added to Trust land become property of the Trust, and 
that the trustees of the Trust could revoke the privilege of residing upon Trust property with 
no obligation to provide compensation for improvements or donations to the Trust. (R. 23). 
B. The Trustees Fail to Defend the Trust in Tort Litigation 
6. In July and August, 2004, a number of litigants initiated two tort lawsuits seeking 
large damage awards against the Trust, Warren Jeffs, the FLDS Church and other 
defendants in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County: Case Nos. 040915857 and 
040918237 (Such cases are hereinafter referred to as the "Tort Lawsuits").5 (R. 7-8,1133, 
3049-3050). 
4
 The FLDS Church was organized in the 1990s by Rulon Jeffs. Its membership 
consisted of many of the people who had donated to the Trust and constructed improvements 
on Trust land. However, a significant number of people who had donated to the Trust were 
not included within the membership of the newly-formed FLDS Church. 
5The claims in the Tort Lawsuits alleged damages based upon the conduct of Warren 
Jeffs. At the time the Tort Lawsuits were filed, Jeffs was the president of the FLDS Church, 
the corporation sole of the Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "FLDS Corporation"), a trustee of the UEP Trust, and 
the president of the board of trustees of the UEP Trust. 
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7. After the Tort Lawsuits were filed, Jeffs and the other trustees failed to defend the 
Trust in the Tort Lawsuits. Notwithstanding their fiduciary duties to the Trust, the trustees 
dismissed the Trust's legal counsel and refused to appear or defend the Tort Lawsuits -
thereby exposing the Trust to the entry of default. (R. 8-9). 
C. Fraudulent Transfers of Trust Property 
8. Within days after the filing of the Tort Lawsuits, the trustees transferred valuable 
Trust property away from the Trust. Specifically, in September, 2004, the trustees 
transferred 1,311 acres of Trust property, as well as a large state-of-the-art manufacturing 
building, to entities who were affiliated with and/or controlled by Jeffs. The Trust received 
no, or very little, consideration in exchange for such transfers. (R. 14-15, 80-89, 91-99, 
179-200). 
9. Such transfers met nearly all of the characteristic "badges of fraud" set forth in the 
Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (See UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-5(2)). 
10. The transferred property was the most valuable non-residential property of the Trust. 
After the transfers, the only remaining property with significant value was the improved 
property - containing hundreds of houses occupied by thousands of people. (R. 15, 3037, 
3039, 3070). 
II. The Trust Probate Action/Reformation of the Trust (2005 to 2006) 
D. The Trust Probate Action 
11. In 2005, the actions of the trustees came to the attention of the Attorneys General 
of the states of Arizona and Utah (the "AGs"). The AGs became concerned that the trustees 
were breaching their fiduciary duties to the Trust. They were particularly concerned that 
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the trustees' actions placed the homes of the people residing upon Trust land at a risk. 
Accordingly, on May 26, 2005, in order to protect the Trust from the malfeasance of its 
trustees, the AGs initiated a trust probate action in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Case No. 053900848 (the "Trust Probate Action"). Acting pursuant to their 
authority and obligations under the Utah Uniform Trust Code and the common law, the 
AGs filed a petition with the Court seeking to suspend the trustees and appoint a special 
fiduciary. The petition also sought other relief, including reformation of the trust at the 
request of interested parties. (R. 1). 
12. In connection with the filing of the Trust Probate Action, the AGs contacted Bruce 
R. Wisan, a certified public accountant in Salt Lake City, and requested him to serve as 
special fiduciary for the Trust in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-100 l(2)(e). 
(R. 16-17). 
13. The breaching trustees refused to appear in the Trust Probate Action. Indeed, no 
person or entity, whether trustee, beneficiary, or otherwise, appeared or spoke in opposition 
to the AGs' petition. (See docket). (R. 511, 547). 
14. Having received no opposition to the petition, the Court entered Orders suspending 
the trustees and ordering them to provide an inventory, accounting, and final report; to 
deliver Trust documents, records, and property; and to cooperate in providing information 
regarding the Trust. The Court also appointed Mr. Wisan (the "Fiduciary") to serve as a 
special fiduciary of the Trust. (R. 220, 548, 1996). 
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E. The Suspended Trusteesy Disobedience of the Court's Orders 
15. The suspended trustees received actual notice of the Trust Probate Action (see ^ [ 24 
& 64(p), below), but they failed to comply with any aspect of the Orders of the Court. (R. 
3028). Rather, they acted to oppose the Fiduciary. Shortly after his appointment, the 
Fiduciary was advised that Church leaders/trustees had instructed their followers to not 
acknowledge or honor the Court's suspension of the trustees of appointment of the 
Fiduciary. (R. 3028, 3694-95). 
F. The Court Seeks Input as to the Future of the Trust 
16. With the trustees' abandonment of the Trust, and their refusal to participate in the 
Trust Probate Action, the Court reached out to all interested individuals for guidance and 
input as to the future of the Trust. To that end, the Court invited interested individuals to 
submit proposals to the Court. Specifically, the Court declared that it would consider 
proposals from the AGs, the suspended trustees, the FLDS Church, and the members of the 
Trust's beneficiary class (which the Court defined to mean any person who had contributed 
property, time, talents, or resources to the Trust). (R. 895). 
17. Many members of the beneficiary class responded to the Court by appearing and/or 
providing recommendations to the Court. All of the responding entities agreed that the 
Court should appoint new leadership for the Trust. {See e.g. R. 937, 1195, 1213, 2091). 
18. After receiving input from interested individuals, the Court issued a 28-page 
Memorandum Decision, dated December 13, 2005, setting forth its findings and analysis 
with respect to the future of the Trust. (R. 3452). 
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G. Reformation of the Trust 
19. The Memorandum Decision sets forth the framework for a reformed trust instrument 
which would allow the Trust to survive despite FLDS leadership's abandonment of the 
Trust. (Id). Accordingly, the Fiduciary, the AGs, and some of the members of the Trust's 
beneficiary class cooperated in preparing a proposed reformed trust declaration in 
accordance with the Memorandum Decision. (See e.g. R. 937, 1195, 1213, 2091). Not a 
single person or entity submitted any objection to the Court's Memorandum Decision, or 
to the specific proposals for reformation of the Trust. (See docket). 
20. On October 25, 2006, the Court completed the formal reformation of the Trust 
pursuant to the execution of the Reformed Declaration of Trust of the United Effort Plan 
Trust Dated October 25, 2006 (the "Reformed Trust Declaration"). (R. 6537 (copy in 
Appellants' Appendix)). At the same time, the Court executed an Order formally removing 
the trustees of the Trust and certifying the trust reformation as a final judgment under Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 6538). 
21. No party or individual filed any appeal or other opposition with respect to the 
reformation of the Trust. (See docket). 
22. Accordingly, 30 days later, on November 25,2006, the Reformed Trust Declaration 
became final and non-appealable. 
H. Notice to the Beneficiary Class 
23. From the beginning of the Trust Probate Action through the completion of the 
reformation process, the Court allowed and encouraged the members of the beneficiary 
class to participate and be heard with respect to the Trust. While charitable trust 
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beneficiaries do not have formal legal standing, the Court nevertheless provided that such 
members would be given notice and an opportunity to participate and provide input. (R. 
549-550, 895, 1996). 
24. The Court, the AGs, and the Fiduciary went to great lengths to provide notice to the 
beneficiary class and to keep them informed of the Trust Probate process. Formal service 
of process was accomplished upon the FLDS Church and the trustees of the Trust, through 
personal and substitute service. (See generally R. 285, 299, 350-546). Furthermore, 
Rodney Parker of Snow Christensen & Martineau (former and current legal counsel to the 
FLDS Church, its leadership and many of its members, including the present Appellants) 
was on the case service list from the beginning and received regular notice of filings. (See 
e.g. R. 228,424,3766,4001). Moreover, notices regarding the Trust Probate Action were 
published in newspapers in Utah, Colorado, Texas, and British Columbia. (R. 539-545). 
In addition, the Fiduciary served multiple notices by mail to every single post office box 
in Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona, and by hand delivery to every residence on 
Trust land in Canada. On other occasions, the Fiduciary served notices by hand delivery 
to every residence on Trust land. Moreover, the Fiduciary held public information 
meetings, in Hildale and in Canada. (For a summary of the many attempts to provide 
notice, seeK. 13373-13375). 
I. The Jeffs Adherents' Refusal to Participate 
25. Notwithstanding the efforts made to provide notice to the community, the Jeffs 
Adherents (including Appellants) chose to abstain from appearing or participating in the 
Trust Probate Action. (See docket). 
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26. In addition, such persons refused to cooperate with the Fiduciary in his efforts to 
administer the Trust. (R. 1130). From the outset of his appointment, the Fiduciary attempted 
to reach out to the Jeffs Adherents for input and guidance as to how the Trust should be 
administered. Such attempts, however, were repeatedly rebuffed. For the most part, the 
Jeffs Adherents refused to even communicate with the Fiduciary. (R. 13249-13250,3694-
3695). 
27. Moreover, the Jeffs Adherents took a number of actions to damage the Trust, to 
increase the costs and burdens of the Trust, and to interfere with the Fiduciary's 
administration of the Trust. Such actions include the destruction and removal of substantial 
property from Trust land. (R. 3059, 3581-3588, 16488, at p. 47). The Jeffs Adherents 
refused to acknowledge the authority of the Court or the Fiduciary, and continued to act as 
if the suspended trustees were still in control of the Trust.6 (R. 3694, 13695). 
J. Reliance Upon the Validity of the Reformation of the Trust 
28. Subsequent to the Court's rulings in the Trust Probate Action, numerous people 
relied upon the Court's final and non-appealable order. While many acts of reliance have 
not been memorialized into the District Court's file, the Fiduciary is aware of many actions 
6
 In stark contrast to the actions of the Jeffs Adherents, a significant number of 
members of the beneficiary class chose to respond to the Court and the Fiduciary. Such 
persons acknowledged the authority of the Court and respected the rule of law. They 
participated in the Trust Probate Action, provided input to the Fiduciary and the Court, paid 
their share of property taxes, entered into occupancy agreements with the Trust, paid monthly 
occupancy fees, filed petitions for benefits with the Trust, and/or otherwise cooperated with 
the Fiduciary in administering the Trust. (For a general description of activities taken by 
people in connection with the Fiduciary's administration of the Trust, see the Fiduciary's 
Reports, at Reports, at R. 1122, 3024, 3690, 4424, 5704, 6858, 7805, 8390, 9261, 10585, 
11145, 12557, 17593). 
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taken by many people because of the rulings of the Court. This reliance included making 
their religious beliefs publicly known in reliance on the Court's assurance of religious 
neutrality; uprooting families and relocating to housing upon Trust property; devoting time 
and effort to improving homes upon Trust property; settling legal claims against the Trust; 
entering into occupancy agreements and/or leases with the Trust; paying property taxes for 
Trust property; submitting petitions for benefits to the Trust; devoting time and resources 
in assisting the Trust and the Fiduciary; entering into contracts with the Trust through the 
Fiduciary; purchasing property from the Trust; and providing legal, engineering and/or 
professional services to the Trust.7 (For a general description of activities taken by people 
in connection with the Fiduciary's administration of the Trust, see the Fiduciary's Reports, 
at Reports, at R. 1122, 3024, 3690, 4424, 5704, 6858, 7805, 8390, 9261, 10585, 11145, 
12557, 17593). 
29. After the Fiduciary was appointed, a number of people alleged legal claims against 
the Trust as a result of the conduct of Warren Jeffs and the former trustees. Most were 
dissuaded from filing legal actions against the Trust based upon the fact that Warren Jeffs 
and the other trustees had been suspended, that the abuses which had occurred under the 
7With the Court's suspension and removal of the former trustees, people reasonably 
expected to be able to reside upon Trust property, and to freely make improvements to such 
property, without the threat of losing their homes and improvements based upon their 
religious beliefs - as had happened under the administration of the former trustees. {See Jeffs 
v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998)). They also expected that they would not be subjected 
to an eviction action for refusing to support the "marriage" of young girls to much older men 
- as had happened under the administration of the former trustees {See United Effort Plan 
Trustv. Holm. 209 Ariz. 347,101 P.3d 641, 643 (Ariz. App. 2004) (Warren Jeffs' attempts 
to evict family from home on Trust property within 10 minutes after mother withdrew her 
consent for 15-year old daughter to marry 39-year old man)). 
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former trustees had stopped, and that the Trust was being reformed. (R. 8410; 3708-3709). 
Similarly, the plaintiffs in the Tort Lawsuits agreed to settle such lawsuits on favorable 
terms to the Trust based upon the fact that the Court had reformed the Trust and the former 
trustees would not be in control. (R. 8026). 
III. Post-Reformation Operations of the Trust (2006 to 2008) 
K. The Fiduciary's Administration of the Trust 
30. In fulfilling his Court-appointed duties, the Fiduciary was guided in all things by the 
rulings of the Court - particularly the Memorandum Decision and the Reformed Trust 
Declaration. Indeed, the Reformed Trust Declaration is the Trust's "constitution" which 
has governed the Fiduciary's administration of the Trust. The Fiduciary takes very 
seriously his obligations under such document to protect the assets of the Trust and to 
provide for the just wants and needs of the beneficiary class in a religiously-neutral manner. 
(R. 13257, 17659). 
31. In fulfilling his duties, the Fiduciary has undertaken myriad difficult and complex 
tasks on behalf of the Trust.8 Such tasks involved significant time and effort on the part of 
Such tasks included, but are not limited to: (1) pursuing fraudulent transfer litigation 
for the recovery of property transferred away from the Trust; (2) defending the Trust in the 
Tort Lawsuits (and ultimately settling the lawsuits on terms which were favorable to the 
Trust, and which preserved the homes of the people); (3) defending the Trust in additional 
lawsuits filed against the Trust (including an additional tort lawsuit seeking a very large 
damage award); (4) investigating and inventorying the assets of the Trust; (5) pursuing 
claims for breach of trust against the suspended trustees, the FLDS Church, and those acting 
with them; (6) participating in the Trust reformation process; (7) managing the assets of the 
Trust; (8) protecting the property of the Trust; (9) investigating the theft of property attached 
to Trust lands; (10) obtaining injunctive relief to help stop the theft of Trust property; (11) 
attempting to achieve payment of the Trust's property taxes; (12) establishing a process for 
members of the beneficiary class to submit petitions for benefits from the Trust; (13) 
considering petitions for benefits received from members of the beneficiary class; (14) 
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the Fiduciary, his assistants, engineers, and legal counsel - and necessarily resulted in the 
Trust's incurrence of costs and expenses. (See f^ 34, below). 
32. The Fiduciary's primary goal is to provide for the housing of the beneficiary class 
by transfer of deeds of outright ownership to individual members. To that end, the 
Fiduciary has sought to subdivide the Trust's property and has established a process for the 
submission of petitions for benefits by members of the beneficiary class. The Fiduciary 
desires to distribute deeds of outright ownership without regard for the religion of the 
petitioning beneficiaries. Such distributions would be without restriction or limitation, such 
that the recipients would be free to transfer the property to any person or entity of their 
liking - including Warren Jeffs and/or the FLDS Church. (R. 17675-17678). 
L. The Trust's Liquidity Problems 
33. One of the problems which has beset the Trust from the beginning of the Trust 
Probate Action has been a lack of liquid funds to meet the expenses of the Trust. While the 
Trust has many assets, such assets consist almost exclusively of illiquid assets - land and 
improvements. (R. 1130, 3037-3039, 3070). Thus, the Trust is obliged to liquidate assets 
seeking to meet the housing needs of Trust beneficiaries; (15) seeking to accomplish the 
survey and subdivision of the Trust's residential property; (16) seeking governmental 
approval for the subdivision of the property; (17) enforcing the Trust's legal rights through 
mandamus litigation; (18) resolving disputes as to the use of Trust property; (19) overseeing 
litigation involving the Trust; and (20) seeking a source of funding for the Trust's financial 
obligations; and (21) submitting regular reports to the Court. (For further details as to the 
actions of the Fiduciary, see the Fiduciary's Reports, at R. 1122, 3024, 3690, 4424, 5704, 
6858, 7805, 8390, 9261, 10585, 11145, 12557, 17593). 
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and/or find alternative sources of funding in order to meet its ongoing expenses/ (R. 
13261, 17627-17631). 
34. After the commencement of the Trust Probate Action, the Trust incurred substantial 
expenses and attorney's fees {see e.g. R. 3216A, 3367, 3768, 3937, 7566, 7766), most of 
which were caused and/or exacerbated by the actions (and inactions) of the former trustees 
and the Jeffs Adherents. (R. 17604-17605). 
3 5. Initially, the Fiduciary was able to obtain liquid funds sufficient to meet the ongoing 
obligations and attorneys' fees of the Trust. However, as time went on, and as the costs and 
expenses of the Trust increased, the Trust found itself unable to meet its financial 
obligations. (R. 10624, 11180). 
36. After consultation with the Court, the Fiduciary devised two methods to raise liquid 
funds: (i) collect assessments from the occupants of Trust property; and/or (ii) sell Trust 
property. (R. 17627-17631). 
37. The Fiduciary first attempted to raise funds by assessing each residence on Trust 
land in Colorado City and Hildale a modest $100 monthly occupancy fee. Unfortunately, 
this method proved to be inadequate because a majority of occupants joined together in 
refusing to make their monthly assessment payments. Thus, the assessment payment funds 
received by the Fiduciary were not sufficient to satisfy the expenses of the Trust. (R. 10608-
10610, 17632-17634). 
9
 Historically, prior to the appointment of the Fiduciary, the Trust received funding 
by collecting donations from the occupants of Trust land, which payments were used toward 
the Trust's financial obligations - including substantial legal fees. 
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38. Next, the Fiduciary determined that it would be necessary to sell property in order 
to meet the financial obligations of the Trust. The Fiduciary first attempted to sell the Beryl 
dairy farm. Such attempted sale, however, was prevented by certain Jeffs Adherents' 
recording of encumbrances against the property and filing of two separate lawsuits seeking 
to stop the sale. (R. 11176, 12579-12582, 17614-17616). With the dairy property tied up 
in litigation, the Fiduciary then determined to sell certain farm property known as the Berry 
Knoll farm. 
M The Berry Knoll Farm 
39. The Berry Knoll property consists of vacant farm ground situated in the southwest 
portion of Colorado City. In the past, the property was farmed by Merlin Jessop (one of the 
Appellants in this case) acting at the direction of a former trustee of the Trust. Under 
Merlin Jessop, the farming operations were never profitable and were heavily subsidized 
by the trustees of the Trust. By 2004, Merlin Jessop had stopped farming the property, and 
irrigation equipment has been removed from the property. When the Fiduciary was 
appointed in 2005, the property has been abandoned for some time. (R. 13891-13892*, 
16448, at pp. 22-23, 47, 53-56). 
40. When the Fiduciary was appointed in 2005, the property had been abandoned. In 
2007, the Fiduciary received a number of complaints about the condition of the property. 
People complained that the property had become a dustbowl and that blowing sand was 
causing a nuisance in the community. Accordingly, the Fiduciary made efforts to find 
someone who would be willing to farm the property. (R. 16488, at pp. 55-56). 
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41. The Fiduciary first sought to have Merlin Jessop return to the property and resume 
his farming operations. On multiple occasions, the Fiduciary's assistant contacted Merlin 
Jessop and asked him to farm the property. Each time, however, Merlin Jessop declined 
- stating that he was not interested in farming the property or entering into any kind of lease 
or agreement with the Fiduciary. After several attempts, the Fiduciary was finally 
successful in finding a willing lessee, Shane Stubbs, who entered into a lease agreement 
with the Trust. (R. 16488, at pp. 50-51, 53-56). 
42. Later, when the Fiduciary's liquidity problems became severe, the Fiduciary 
determined that it would be necessary to sell a portion of the Berry Knoll farm property. 
(R. 13556). 
43. After initial inquiries and marketing efforts, the Fiduciary located a potential buyer 
who made an offer for a portion of the property. Such offer was subject to (i) approval of 
the Court; and (ii) better offers. (R. 13556, 16785, 16796). 
44. To date, the Trust has been unable to complete the sale of the Berry Knoll property 
as a result of Jeffs Adherents voluminous litigation attacks. {See ffl[ 45-55, below). 
IV. The Trust Comes Under Attack (2008 to 2009) 
N. Appellants' Change of Tactics 
45. After refusing to participate in the Trust Probate Action for more than three years, 
in August 2008, Appellants hired legal counsel and the Trust became the target of a 
litigation assault designed to collaterally attack the Court's reformation of the Trust, to 
cripple the Fiduciary's ability to administer the Trust in accordance with the Reformed 
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Declaration of Trust, and/or to starve the Trust of funds needed to defend itself in 
litigation.10 (R. 17603-17606). 
46. Appellants employed the services of five different law firms, while various other 
Jeffs Adherents employed three additional firms, to attack the Fiduciary, the Trust, and the 
Court in several different courts. 
47. Underlying each of Appellants5 various attacks was a refusal to accept the fact that 
the Trust has been reformed. (R. 13243, 13253-13258). 
48. In suddenly appearing in the litigation process, the Jeffs Adherents did not disclose 
that they were acting at the bidding of Warren Jeffs, but alleged that they were acting as 
individuals and on behalf of associations of individuals. (See Iffl 45-56, below). 
O. Numerous Attempts to Stop the Sale of the Berry Knoll Property 
49. Initially, the focus of Appellants' litigation attacks was to prevent the sale of the 
Berry Knoll property. This included litigation attacks in four different Courts seeking to 
stop the Court from even holding a hearing on the proposed sale: 
a. Appellants filed at least six different filings in the Trust Probate Court designed to 
stop the sale of the property. (R. 13193, 13826, 13940, 13965, 14582, 14624.) 
b. In October, 2008, Appellants' counsel filed a lawsuit against the Fiduciary, the AGs, 
and Judge Lindberg in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case 
No. 2:08-CV-772. On November 5, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order in such lawsuit - seeking to enjoin the Trust Probate 
Court from holding the scheduled hearing on the sale of the Berry Knoll property. 
(R. 17618-17620). 
c. On November 7, 2008, Appellants filed a lawsuit in Arizona State Court, together 
with an Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining Order, again seeking to 
10
 The Fiduciary subsequently discovered that the Appellants' change in tactics was 
done at the instruction of Warren Jeffs. (See ^ 65, below). 
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enjoin the sale of the property. Case No. CV 2008-204 7 in the Si iperior Coi irt of 
Mohave County, Arizona, (R. 17620-17621), 
d On November 10,2008, Appellants filed a Rule 8 Petition for Emergency Relief in 
the this Court seeking to enjoin the Trust Probate Court from holding a hearing on 
the sale of the property. Case No. 20080928-SC. (R. 17621-17622). 
e. Plaintiffs also attempted to stop the sale by recording improper notices of interest 
as encumbrances against the property (R. 17629). 
P. Other Vexatious Litigation 
50. In addition to the above-stated attacks of Appellants, the Trust was subjected to 
many other vexatious lawsuits and litigation attacks in 2008 - mostly by other Jeffs 
Adherents. 
a. In February, 2008, the Trust was sued by a litigant alleging a lien upon Trust 
property based upon the actions of the former trustees. Case No. 080500593 in the 
Fifth District Court of Washington County, I Jtah. (R. 17612-17613). 
b. In March, 2008. the i rust was sued by Sterling Harker and William Harker (a Jeffs 
Adherent) in an eflor! to prevent the sale of the Trust's dairy farm, Case No. 
080500225 in the Fifth District Court of Iron County, I Jtah, (R 17614) 
c. In July, 2008, a law firm (representing the cities of Hildale and Colorado City and 
their citizens) issued a press release stating that "the days of the FLDS not defending 
themselves in Court is over." (R. 12573, 12937). Thereafter, the law firm initiated 
a number of litigation attacks against the Fiduciary - in the Trust Probate Action and 
elsewhere - including attacks on the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll farm property. 
(See e.g. R. 11961, 14098) 
d. In July, 2008, a lawsuit was filed by Amnion Harker and a number of other Jeffs 
Adherents asserting claims to the Trust's dairy property. Case No. 080500538 in the 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, Utah. (R. 17615-17616). 
e. On August 29, 2008, the former trustees and the FLDS Church filed a lawsuit 
against the Fiduciary alleging fraud upon the court in connection with the Trust's 
obtaining default judgment in its 2006 lawsuit, Case No. 080918199 in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, I Jtah (R 17617). 
f. On September 10, 2008, a Irust beneficiary, Guy Steed, filed a lawsuit against the 
Trust challenging the Fiduciary's ability to control the property of the Trust, Case 
No. 080502450 in the Fifth District Court of Washington County, Utah. (R. 17617-
17618). 
Q. The Litigation Stay 
51. On November 14,2008, the Court in the Trust Probate Action ordered that it would 
delay ruling on the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll farm in order to give the parties an 
opportunity to pursue settlement negotiations. In so doing, the Court recognized that the 
stay of the sale would hinder the Trust's ability to defend itself in litigation. Accordingly, 
the Court entered a litigation stay enjoining any and all parties from pursuing litigation 
against the Trust without obtaining leave of the Trust Probate Court. (R. 14707). 
R. Continued Litigation Attacks After the Entry of the Litigation Stay 
52. In violation of the litigation stay, Appellants continued to pursue legal attacks 
against the Trust in 2009. (R. 15229, 15283, 15324, 15244, 19027,19611, 19648.) 
53. In addition, Appellants filed a misleading attack on the Fiduciary related to the sale 
of some cattle by the Trust's dairy farm. (R. 14754.) 
54. Furthermore, in 2009 Appellants were involved in the filing of four 
appeals/petitions with this Court: (i) Case No. 20090691-SC; (ii) Case No. 20090859-SC; 
(iii) Case No. 20091006-SC; and (iv) a petition for emergency relief, dated December 29, 
2009 (filed in Case No. 20090859-SC). (R. 17623, 17626-17627). 
55. In addition to Appellants' attacks, a number of other Jeffs Adherents violated the 
litigation stay by initiating additional legal proceedings against the Trust in 2009 - without 
obtaining relief from the litigation stay, as follows: 
a. In the Trust Probate Action, numerous motions were filed in violation of the 
litigation stay. (R. 16506, 19830A, 16870, 16892, 19513.) 
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b. On September 4, 2009, a lawsuit was filed against the Fiduciary and his accounting 
firm in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Case No. 3:09-
cv-8152, by Roland Cooke, a member of the beneficiary class. (R. 17624). 
c. On September 23, 2009, a lawsuit was filed by Guy Ream, purportedly acting on 
behalf of the UEP Trust and FLDS Church, against Judge Lindberg, the Utah 
Attorney General, the Fiduciary, and the State of Utah in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:09-cv-856, attacking, among other things, 
the reformation of the I "rust (R 17624-17625). 
d. On September 23, 2009, the municipalities of Hildale and Colorado City filed a 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the this Court seeking to enjoin the Trust 
Probate Court from authorizing the sale of the Berry Knoll property, Case No. 
20090781-SC. (P 1 -VO-17626). 
5<» I hi)s. ikspitt -hi litigation stay, the Trust has continually faced litigation attacks 
and has continued to incur legal fees - thereby worsening its liquidity crisis. 
S. Appellants Usurp Control Over the Berry Knoll Property 
57. In connection with their change of litigation tactics, Appellants also changed their 
positioi I with respect to the i ise of the Berry Knoll farm property. Having refused to farm 
the property for several years, Appellants decided to claim the property for themselves 
.^ •i ^ ! h J ' •'•iung the consent ofthe Fiduciary or the Court and knowing 
that the property had been leased to someone else. (JR. 16488, at pp. 50 51, 55-56; R. 
17642-I 7M4) 
58. Appellants placed sheep and cattle on the property, destroyed crops planted by 
s ,i. iu ^\.' '" ' '. " I. s;ee, and planted their own crops on the property. The 
Fiduciary attempted to have the trespassers removed from the property, but ;u-1 OMKS.IO 
i ;; |-u4u t ^Pl. •/•-' »..•!'.M.\I I.- ?iling. lb this day, Appellants continue to usurp 
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control over the property, in violation of the instructions of the Fiduciary and the rights of 
Shane Stubbs. (R. 16488, at pp. 50-51, 55-56; R. 17642-17644). 
V. The Trust in Crisis 
59. Today, the Trust faces a serious liquidity crisis and litigation crisis. 
60. The Trust is in a liquidity crisis because it has incurred in excess of $2 million in 
unpaid professional fees going back to 2007 without being able to raise the funds needed 
to pay such fees. (R. 17627-17629, 17669-17675). The Trust's efforts to generate funds 
for the payment of expenses has been stymied at every turn by the Jeffs Adherents. The 
Trust's inability to pay its financial obligations has placed a serious burden upon the Trust, 
the Fiduciary, as well as its legal counsel and engineers.11 (R. 17672-17675). 
61. The Trust is in a litigation crisis due to the bombardment of legal attacks. Since 
2008, the Trust has been a party in 23 different civil actions and appeals, most of which are 
still pending. (R. 17602-17626). The Trust's ability to defend itself in such litigation has 
been severely compromised because of its inability to pay its financial obligations. During 
much of the time that the Jeffs Adherents have used the services of eight different law firms 
11
 The Trust's financial obligations were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the 
Trust in the course of the Fiduciary's fulfillment of his Court-appointed duties. The 
overwhelming amount of litigation facing the Trust has necessarily resulted in substantial 
legal fee obligations. (R. 17602-17627, 17669-17675). Even so, the total amount of the 
Trust's debt is only a small fraction of the value of the Trust's assets. 
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in attacking the Trust, the Trust has had only one primary law ii rni uuvu-.v: •=. i /ivas.12 
(See Y * <• • • •< v-i / O / J ) . 
62. The combination of the liquidity crisis and litigation crisis tiiFcau-n -:K M : / 
survive » •, * ic ; - • •». -s ;• serious risk that it may be unable to defend itself in 
litigation, and may be forced to default in one or more of the lawsuits filed against it. 
. Appellants bau cffa fiirh employed a two-pronged approach in attacking the 
Trust: (i) inundate the Trust with overwhelming litigation; while (ii) starve the Trust of 
desperates -nouk'*: 
VI. The Knowledge and Intent of Warren Jeffs and His Followers 
64. In recent months Ihe hdnnii \ lias in civrd copies of relevant documents which 
provide insight as to the knowledge and intent of Warren Jeffs and his adherents, as 
follows: 
a. Warren Jeffs believed that it was a "the directive of the Lord" that theT: \ OS people 
"be driven from Short Creek." (R. 19598). 
b. Jeffs taught that "we will be scattered as a people and then the faithful will be 
gathered." (R. 19596). 
c Jeffs taught that the U [iV lYusl land \\ as "ivjcclrd < A God, and is not the gathering 
place/'; (R. 19596). 
12
 The Trust's lack of funding has made it difficult for the Trust to find other counsel 
willing to represent the Trust. Fortunately, the Fiduciary has been successful in obtaining 
the services of some additional law firms, who have been willing to represent the Trust in 
certain areas on a delayed-payment basis. This, along with the litigation stay, has saved the 
Trust from defaulting in the many lawsuits filed against it, and has allowed the Trust to 
survive for the time being. However, without a source of funding in the near future, it will 
be extremely difficult for the Fiduciary and legal counsel to continue to defend the interests 
of the Trust. (R. 17680-17681) 
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Jeffs taught that the people would be rejected unless they moved away from the 
Trust's land and qualified for relocation to new "lands of refuge" (located in Texas 
and elsewhere). (R. 19596). 
Jeffs was involved in criminal conduct - ordering an increasing number of 
"marriages" of "very young girls." (R. 19602, 19600, 19601). 
Jeffs accelerated the practice of marrying young girls for the purpose of bringing 
the government against his people. (R. 19602, 19600, 19601) 
At an official meeting of the UEP trustees, Jeffs and the trustees made the 
unanimous decision to default in the Tort Lawsuits. (R. 19604-19606). 
At the same meeting, the trustees unanimously agreed to transfer certain property 
out of the Trust so that such property would "not get into the courts." (R. 19605). 
Jeffs believed that his refusal to defend the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits would cause 
the government to intervene and would put the Trust's land "under government 
control." (R. 19605). 
Jeffs believed that in causing the government to intervene he was "fulfilling the 
directive of the Lord" that the people be driven from the Short Creek area. (R. 
19598). 
Jeffs knew that the decision to default in the Tort Lawsuits would be viewed by the 
courts as a breach of the trustees' fiduciary duties. {See UEP Response, dated 
February 11, 2010, filed in Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20090859, at Exh. 5). 
Jeffs instructed the trustees that "our fiduciary duty is to God and Priesthood not 
to the courts." (R. 19604). 
After defaulting in the Tort Lawsuits, Jeffs made arrangements to gather and 
sequester the UEP Trust records. (R. 19607-19608). 
Jeffs forbade his followers from becoming involved in Trust litigation, with the 
instruction: "Answer them nothing and don't give them any testimony or witness." 
(R. 19741). 
Shortly after the commencement of the Trust Probate Action, Jeffs made 
arrangements for the destruction of many documents and for the sequestering of 
other documents into a vault in Texas. {See UEP Response, dated February 11, 
2010, filed in Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20090859, at Exh. 2). 
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p. Jeffs received regular updates as to the actions of the Court and mc v m> joiai y in the 
Trust Probate Action. (See e.g. R. 19592, 19593). 
i Notwithstanding their being suspended as trustees, Jeffs and other trustees 
continued to exercise control and management over Trust property, (R 19578). 
r ieffs received favorable reports about Judge Lindberg and the Fiduciary "wanting 
o be friendly to our people" (R. 19596). 
s. Jeffs told his people that Judge Lindberg and the Fidiu laiy \\\:uy «>( ilv devil ' and 
that their friendliness was "flattery." (R. 19596). 
t. Jeffs instructed his followers that they must "continue to answer them nothing and 
not give into their proposals and ways." (R. 19596). 
11 Jeffs stated that "we will not work out our differences so called with this judge and 
the government." (R. 19596). 
l.aiei\w:i!ieuMiuo.i:- I * .-i-.l-.i .u i • • ai, Jeffs modified his "answer 
them nothing" command and issued a new instruction to some of his followers. 
Specifically, Jet!;- inslructa! \\ illie Jessop i»» lead n roalition of followers, hire legal 
counsel, become involved in the Trust Probate Action, and "demand[] to have their rights 
protected concerning me: ;• » n - •- \ v. Jcssop was further told 
to conceal Warren Jeffs' role in the new litigation strategy, as Jeffs instructed that the so-
called coalition appear "as a grou ••. v i j • s; \ - < .-,.;, ^  i ng in the authorities of 
the Church." (Id). 
\ few months after such insti uction, Willie Jessop and the other Appellants, with 
their numerous law firms, began their litigation attack. (See Tffl 45-56, above). 
/ Now, Appellants have filed tl ie present ap* v<« • -. ^  ;tig to formally intervene in the 
Trust Probate Action - so they can be in an even greater position to harass the Trust with 
frivolous, vexatious litigation. 
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RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
It is beyond the scope of this Brief to provide a point-by-point rebuttal to every false 
and misleading allegation of Appellants. However, the examples discussed below are 
indicative of Appellants blatant disregard for the truth. 
I. False Accusations of Religious Discrimination 
Appellants have fabricated claims of religious discrimination in an attempt to falsely 
blame the Fiduciary for the consequences of their decision to abandon the Trust and their 
refusal to participate in the trust probate proceedings. 
Appellants complain that Court did not appoint any FLDS members to serve on the 
Trust's advisory board. When the board was established, and later expanded, no FLDS 
person applied to serve on the board. On two different occasions, in 2005 and 2007, the 
Court opened up the process for receiving applications for board membership, but did not 
receive a single application from any FLDS person. Thus, the religious make-up of the 
advisory board is not because of any discrimination on the part of the Court. Rather, it was 
merely the natural consequence of the choices of the FLDS people to not seek membership 
on the board.13 
Next, Appellants accuse the Fiduciary of discrimination in the hiring of non-FLDS 
persons to assist in the administration of the Trust. No FLDS person was willing to work 
for the Fiduciary - or even talk to the Fiduciary. The Fiduciary tried to hire and/or do 
13
 Now, Appellants would have the Court re-open the nomination process again to 
allow only FLDS members to be appointed to the board. When the time comes for the 
appointment of new members to the advisory board, the Court will consider all applicants in 
a fair manner without religious discrimination for or against any person. Now, as always, 
the Fiduciary is open to input from the FLDS and non-FLDS. 
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business with FLDS persons, but he has been repeatedly rebuffed in his efforts l(A.\ 
176%-1 765()), Tin: Fiducian hired non-FLDS persons because they were the only ones 
available - not because of any religious discrimination. 
Next, Apjk Hants license the Hducinrv of discrimination in the disposition of Trust 
housing.14 The Fiduciary established a non-discriminatory process for the submission of 
petitions for bun-- its = *'•• ' : • * i ^ U-ncf <. iaries overwhelmingly refused to 
participate in such process. The Fiduciary received petitions and housing requests from 
over three hundred members ol the beneficiary class. I he Fiduciary responded to such 
petitions based upon the merits of the petitions and the housing available. In so doing, the 
Fiduciary did IU»i ask llie leln.'iuii ml iihc pclilioners, nm did lie base anv decisions on the 
professed religion of the petitioner. If non-FLDS beneficiaries have received more benefits 
thanl : ^ \ r : • ..], .: n^duM iiu-v ,\ -n,u-UHi: u •fits while the other did not. 
The Fiduciary cannot grant a petition he never received. 
Next, Appellants accuse tl le Fiduciary of discrimination becai ise one of the Trust's 
attorneys characterized the situation with Jeffs and the Trust beneficiaries as a sociological 
and psychological war. Such wai was commenced and {\\>^ ]l>^ '-V- •••-. h-\ \ nL ociuie 
the Fiduciary was appointed. The Fiduciary and the reformed Trust were thrust into the 
war.15 
14
 Appellants' accusations against the Fiduciary are based solely upon the Affidavit 
of Jake Barlow, dated May 21,2009. This affidavit contains improper hearsay and argument, 
and suffers from numerous other defects. (For a more detailed response to such affidavit, see 
the Fiduciary's December, 2009 Report (R. 17661-17666)). 
15
 Certainly, the Fiduciary was not responsible for the war. The record shows that, 
s i'*1! / after his appointment, the Fiduciary reached out to the FLDS Trust beneficiaries and 
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The core problem underlying Appellants' claims of discrimination is a refusal to 
accept or acknowledge the Court's reformation of the Trust and its requirement of religious 
neutrality. Appellants cling to the superseded Restated Trust Declaration and demand that 
the Fiduciary administer the Trust in a manner which will discriminate in favor of FLDS 
beneficiaries and against non-FLDS beneficiaries. (See R. 13243, 13253-13258). Thus, 
Appellants mischaracterize religious neutrality as religious discrimination. Expecting 
discriminatory treatment in their favor, they misperceive religious neutrality as religious 
discrimination against them. 
II. Mischaracterization of the Trust Probate Action 
Appellants mischaracterize the motives and actions of the AGs and the Court. In 
initiating the Trust Probate Action, the AGs were not attempting to take over the Trust, or 
to harm the FLDS people.16 Rather, they were merely complying with their legal duties to 
sought to protect their interests. When Jeffs received favorable reports about the Fiduciary, 
he told his followers that the Fiduciary and the Court were "of the devil", and that their 
friendly overtures were "flattery." (See ^ 64(s), above). Jeffs had strong psychological and 
sociological power over his followers. As the FLDS prophet, Jeffs threatened severe 
religious penalties to those who disobeyed him. Falling out of Jeffs' favor routinely resulted 
in immediate loss of church status, spouse(s), children, home, and livelihood. Thus, the Jeffs 
Adherents followed Jeffs' instructions by refusing to have anything to do with the Fiduciary 
and the Court, and by acting with hostility. The Fiduciary is desirous of bringing an end to 
the hostility and improving communication and cooperation. 
Accordingly, when the Fiduciary's counsel learned that Jeffs had confessed that he 
was not a prophet, he was hopeful that this would allow for a thawing of relations with the 
Jeffs Adherents. As Jeffs was the apparent cause of the beneficiaries' hostility, it was hoped 
that his confession would bring an end to the war. Thus, in its proper context, the attorney's 
notation that Warren Jeffs' confession may be relevant in the ongoing war is not inaccurate 
or improper. It is simply an expression of hope that the confession may bring about an end 
of the war and cause the Trust beneficiaries to communicate and cooperate. 
16Contrary to misperception, the AGs did not take any assets away from the FLDS 
Church. The assets of the Trust were never assets of the FLDS Church. Those who created 
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protect the Trust from the malfeasance of its breaching trustees, and in so doing pr« u > 
homes of the peopk (»V<, 11> \.n hit M i liarities § 136 (Attorney General has duty to 
institute proceedings to stop or redress wrongful conduct of trustees of charitable trust)). 
Similarly, the Coi u t was not operating under any improper motive in granting the 
AGs' petition, but was merely fulfilling its legal obligations. Given the unrefuted evidence 
of the trustees' abandonment and of fraudulent ti ansfers. and given the trustees' refusal to 
appear and account for their conduct, the Court had no choice but to grant the petition: 
Neither the C-. v ^ :i4oIn I- pi;«*«-«I into si ich positions. The problem 
was dumped in their laps by the breaching trustees. They nevertheless responded in good 
faith by following the law ami protecting lite assets oRIx Tnist for the entire beneficiary 
class. 
Appellants claim thai the < unit uiul in n lonnmjj, the I nisi In require that decisions 
be made on the basis of religious neutrality. Appellants failed to appeal the order of 
reformation and are barred iinm i < illalna'lly allacking it now Regardless, the Court acted 
properly in its order. With the trustees' abandonment of the Trust, and their refusal to 
participate, the Court KK\ U .-;. . • a U* n-.;.-- c^adine v\!; a a- u* with the Trust and its 
property. The Court omld- \ \ At- nothing; (ii) terminate the Trust; or (iii) appoint new 
leadership to administer i .. 
the Trust, and those who contributed to it, could have donated such property to the FLDS 
Church had they so desired. They did not. Instead, they chose to create the Trust, and donate 
property to it. They further chose to make it a Utah charitable trust, subject to all of the laws 
of charitable trusts in Utah - including the doctrine of cypres. 
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Doing nothing would result in the loss of the homes of the Trust beneficiaries - both 
FLDS and non-FLDS. Without intervention and the appointment of new leadership, the 
Trust would be subjected to large default judgment awards in the Tort Lawsuits, resulting 
in the eventual loss of Trust assets. 
If the Court were to terminate the Trust, the likely result would be the same: a loss of 
the Trust's property in the Tort Lawsuits. The then-governing Restated Trust Declaration 
provided that if the Trust were terminated the property of the Trust would go to Warren 
Jeffs, as the FLDS corporation sole.17 At the time the Trust Probate Action was filed, both 
Jeffs and the FLDS Church were defendants in the same Tort Lawsuits which had been 
filed against the Trust. Both of these defendants had defaulted in such lawsuits and default 
had been entered as to such defendants. Thus, terminating the Trust and transferring its 
property to Warren Jeffs would have made such property, once again, subject to the 
execution of default judgments in the Tort Lawsuits. 
The Court' s third option - to appoint new leadership for the Trust - would provide the 
best chance for saving the homes of the people. Newly-appointed leadership would be 
under a fiduciary duty to appear in the Tort Lawsuits and defend the Trust. Furthermore, 
the third option was the only option which would comply with governing trust law. The 
law does not favor termination of a charitable trust. It disfavors the forfeiture of property 
which has been pledged toward a charitable purpose. Where it becomes impossible or 
17Warren Jeffs was the very man who was in breach of his fiduciary duties to the 
Trust, who had refused to defend the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits, and who had transferred 
Trust property away from the Trust as soon as the Tort Lawsuits were filed. He had also 
disobeyed the Court's Order to provide records and an accounting regarding the Trust. 
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unfeasible for a charitable trust to continue under its existing charter, a trust may be 
•>:*< - M I - - k i« • • • • ••;»! cv nrcs pnnxrh surviving with a charitable purpose. (See 
e.g. Matter of Gerber. 652 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1982)). 
In unified in in Willi (he 1 mst Probate petition, and the hearings held thereon, not a 
single person or entity argued in favor of the first two options. Rather, every person who 
appeared on the matter i lrged the Court to appoint new leadership in order to protect Trust 
property. Thus, given the law, and given the circumstances facing the Court, the Court was 
clearly correct in its decision to reject termii la • the I n ist in favor of appointing new 
leadership and reforming the Trust. 
l i x * •.:... ' -u _i i •. - •« (• i iew leadership would require 
reformation of" the I rust .%> it -a* od n<- i ! 1)S adherent was willing to defend or 
administer the I rust I Im-. ;mv inevn leadership would have to come from outside the 
Church. The Court correctly recognized that such non-FLDS leadership would be unable 
to administer the 1 nisi in diandanei <^ifli INK* of its stated purposes. Specifically, the 
Court found that the Trust had two purposes under the Restated Trust Declaration: (i) to 
promote the doctrines and goals of the F 1 DS Church; and (ii) to pro\ ide for the just wants 
and needs of the beneficiary class. The Court determined that, because the Trust existing 
atonal iime promoted illegal activity and because no H PS person was willing to serve as 
new leadership for the Trust, the Trust could not appropriately be administered in a manner 
to promote nic .ineiiiue— • i : P- !- --• »*» •- — .-v to reform the trust 
instrument to focus exclusively on the second purpose of the Trust - to provide for the just 
wants and n^.j-- o: me benclieiaiy i las.o I In lehe.iou1. purposes of tbf I mst were 
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necessarily reformed because, under the law, it would not be appropriate for the Court, or 
any non-FLDS leadership, to promote illegal activity or to make determinations as to what 
would, or would not, promote the doctrines of the FLDS Church. 
By reforming the Trust, the Court saved the Trust's property and assured that it would 
continue to be used toward a charitable purpose. Although such reformed purpose was not 
exactly the same as the original purposes stated in the Restated Trust Declaration, it was as 
close to such purpose as was reasonably possible under the circumstances. Without 
reforming the Trust to modify its impossible, impracticable purposes, the Trust would have 
failed and its assets would have been lost.18 
Next, Appellants' Brief mischaracterizes the holdings of the District Court with 
respect to standing, and wrongfully suggests that the Court has been inconsistent in its 
treatment of Appellants and other interested parties in this case. The record shows that the 
Court's actions have been consistent and in accordance with the law. From the beginning 
of its involvement of this case, the Court has invited input from the members of the Trust's 
beneficiary class (R. 895) and has allowed them to be heard with respect to matters 
affecting the Trust. The Court has not varied from such practice, and continues to entertain 
input from interested beneficiaries, including Appellants. 
18Appellants fail to acknowledge that, even if the District Court erred in reforming the 
Trust (which it did not), it is now too late to undo such reformation. The Court's reformation 
has been final and non-appealable since 2006. Hundreds of people have made decisions in 
reliance upon the validity and finality of such reformation. They have done so in respect for 
the rule of law and the authority of the judicial system of the State of Utah. In contrast, 
Appellants knew about the Trust Probate Action, yet they willfully failed to appear or be 
heard. Under such circumstances, there is neither a legal or equitable case for undoing the 
reformation of the Trust. To do so would violate the legitimate expectations of hundreds of 
people, reward dilatory and inequitable behavior, and make a mockery of the rule of law. 
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That being said, the Court has never ruled that individual beneficiaries are formal 
pan ; - • : .ipp ' • .ivas of the case. It is one thing to allow 
beneficiaries to be heard and provide input. It is quite another to grant them formal party 
•inns. .iiui jj-.-i •••:. - nanart 'ne Irust and to inundate it with 
vexatious litigation. The members of the beneficiary class exceed 10,000 in number. It 
would he whol'h, impi mi icable and dot in not ital to afford formal party status to the members 
of such a large class. 
As discussed below, .-< • 1- • - ; •' ' a r ^ a the beneficiary 
class of a charitable trust do not have standing as parties (subject to the extremely rare 
"special interest" exception). (Set ?pp 42 4 - \, below ) Theprii nai > pi irpose for this rule is 
to prevent the Trust from being subjected to vexatious litigation by potential beneficiaries. 
The present case is a textbook example nl the wisdnni ml "-'ui'li piinciplc Hetv (he present 
Appellants have not been content to merely appear and provide input to the Court. Rather, 
they have deluged the' I rust with a flood of litigation which has threatened its very survival. 
The Court was wholly correct in denying formal standing to Appellants there was 
nothing inconsistent or discriminaa .j
 :: .. ; K-IU.I1. 
Next, Appellants falsely accuse the Fiduciary of violating the Orders of the Court by 
incurring debt will 101 u aval Jable liquid funds io pa) such tlrh In making sinii arrusations, 
Appellants have taken a partial quote from the Court's Order out of context, and have 
completely misconstrued its meaning and pin pose. ! hepn>\ isionaf issue dors not prohibit 
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the Fiduciary from incurring debt. Rather, it was designed to protect the Fiduciary. Indeed, 
this provision was included in the Order at the Fiduciary's request.19 (R. 1146). 
Next, Appellants falsely accuse the Fiduciary of "collusion" with counsel for the 
Trust's opponents in connection with the defense of the Tort Lawsuits filed against the 
Trust. The Fiduciary vigorously defended the interests of the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits -
and thereby avoided default judgment and preserved the homes of the people.20 
19In 2005, when considering whether to accept appointment to serve as a special 
fiduciary in this case, the Fiduciary recognized that the Trust may have a liquidity problem 
- whereby there would be a lack of liquid funds available to meet the Trust's financial 
obligations. The Fiduciary knew that the Trust could likely incur significant obligations 
before liquid funds would become available to satisfy such obligations. The Fiduciary was 
concerned about accepting responsibilities from the Court without having the funds necessary 
to fulfill such responsibilities. Accordingly, the Fiduciary requested that the Court's Order 
include a provision which limited his responsibilities to the extent of funds available for the 
fulfillment of such responsibilities. Contrary to Appellants' assertion, this provision did not 
limit the "activities" of the Fiduciary, it merely protected the Fiduciary by allowing him to 
limit his "responsibilities" in the event of a lack of funds. At no time was it ever intended 
that this provision would prohibit the Trust from incurring debt for the payment of the 
professional fees. On the contrary, it was always understood that the Trust lacked liquid 
funds, that the Fiduciary and legal counsel would be obliged to work without immediate 
payment, and that they would be reimbursed when liquid funds were made available. 
In the present case, the Fiduciary and his legal counsel could have stopped functioning 
the moment the Trust ran out of liquid funds to pay their professional fees without violating 
the Fiduciary's Court-appointed duties. Had they done so, the Trust would likely have failed. 
It would have been left without defense in pending lawsuits and without ongoing 
management or administration. Its property, including the homes of the people, would likely 
have been lost. The Fiduciary and legal counsel did not walk away due to a lack of liquid 
funds. Rather, operating on the promise of payment in the future, the Fiduciary and legal 
counsel continued to serve the Trust without immediate payment - at significant hardship and 
sacrifice. 
20
 The fact that opposing counsel was adverse to the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits does 
not mean that the Fiduciary or his counsel were forbidden from communicating or 
cooperating with such counsel in connection with other matters where the parties were not 
adverse. In certain respects, the interests of the Trust and the plaintiffs in the Tort Lawsuits 
were aligned. This is true with respect to the Fiduciary's efforts to increase the assets of the 
Trust and to obtain recompense for damages which had been inflicted on the Trust by the 
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Finally, Appellants have grossly mischaracterized the financial impact of the Trust 
Probate Action. They falsely assert that the Fiduciary' s administration has been financially 
devastating to the Trust, when in reality, the net assets of the Trust have actually increased 
substantially under the leadership of the Fiduciary. 
It is true that the Trust has incurred substantial costs and attorneys fees since 2005. 
This is not surprising given the multitude of tasks facing the Fiduciary, and the constant 
hostility, obstruction, and litigation attacks which have been directed toward the Trust. 
Given that the Trust has been involved in 23 different civil actions and appeals since 2008, 
it is to be expected that the Trust would have substantial legal fees. 
Moreover, the Fiduciary has brought a number of assets into the Trust, and the value 
of such assets is significantly greater than the total amount of the Trust's costs and 
expenses, including legal fees, since the appointment of the Fiduciary.21 The Trust's 
balance sheet is in a better position today than it was on the day the Fiduciary was 
appointed in 2005. 
The Fiduciary has also prevented the loss of Trust property to litigants who have filed 
lawsuits against the Trust. Not only did the Fiduciary prevent the entry of default 
breaching trustees and their associates. Accordingly, it was wholly appropriate for the 
Fiduciary and opposing counsel to communicate and cooperate as to such matters. 
21
 The Fiduciary reached successful settlement agreements in the fraudulent-transfer 
lawsuit which resulted in the Trust receiving (1) a return of the manufacturing building, 
valued at approximately $ 1,600,000; (2) a return of 715 acres of land; and (3) approximately 
$1,600,000 in cash. Later, the Fiduciary was successful in obtaining a default judgment in 
the Trust's lawsuit against the former trustees and the FLDS Church. Through judgment 
collection efforts, the Trust obtained ownership of the companies which own the dairy farm 
in Beryl, Utah - which was then valued at approximately $5 million. Thus, the Fiduciary 
has brought property into the Trust valued at approximately $10 million. 
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judgments in the two Tort Lawsuits, he has also defended the Trust in other lawsuits which 
have been filed against the Trust - including a third tort action seeking large monetary 
damages against the Trust. 
Thus, rather than decimating the Trust, the Fiduciary has saved it and improved it. 
III. Response to Allegations About the Berry Knoll Farm Sale 
Appellants suggest that the proposal to sell Berry Knoll Farm is intended to harm the 
FLDS people when, in reality, the Fiduciary is simply trying to resolve the Trust's liquidity 
crisis. After considering numerous alternatives, the Fiduciary has determined that selling 
non-residenlial property is the best (possibly the only) feasible method for raising badly-
needed funds. 
When the Fiduciary determined to sell the Berry Knoll property, he did not believe 
(and still does not believe today) that the property had economic or religious significance 
precluding the Trust from selling it. The property had been abandoned and allowed to 
become a dustbowl. 
Appellants' argument, that the property has economic and religious significance to the 
FLDS people, is not credible. Such claims are pretexts. The real motive of Appellants is 
to stop the Trust from selling any property at all - such that the Trust will be starved of 
funds needed for its survival. It is telling that, every time the Fiduciary seeks to sell 
property, Appellants try to sabotage the sale by alleging that such property has special 
economic or religious significance. This includes the Berry Knoll farm, the Beryl dairy 
farm, and even ordinary cows. Each time, Appellants' claims have been exposed as 
falsehoods and pretexts. 
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In the case of the Fiduciary's proposal to sell the Berry Knoll farm, Appellants first 
claimed that the farm had special economic significance - alleging that the property is the 
"breadbasket" of the community and a major contributor to the FLDS storehouse. 
(R. 13826.) Such allegations were disproven when it was revealed that the ground is poor, 
that the farming operations on the property had never been profitable, that the farm had 
historically required heavy subsidies from the Trust, that the Trust had stopped subsidizing 
the farm by 2004, that the farming of the property had ceased by 2004, and that the former 
farmers ofthe property had abandoned the property. (R. 13891-13892;R. 16488, at pp. 22-
23). 
Next, after the weaknesses of their "economic" allegations were exposed, Appellants 
suddenly began alleging that the property held special religious significance - that it was 
a prophesied future temple site ofthe FLDS Church. Such allegations are suspect due to 
their late timing. Appellants filed a verified motion and memorandum seeking to stop the 
sale which never once mentioned that the property was a future temple site. Similarly, in 
two days of deposition testimony regarding the Berry Knoll property, Appellants never 
once raised the "temple site" allegation. It was only after their original "economic 
significance" allegations were discredited that they first raised the allegation of "religious 
significance." (R. 13880*). 
The Fiduciary has investigated Appellants' "temple site" allegations and has 
confirmed that they are a pretext. The FLDS Church long ago rejected the leadership ofthe 
man who made the temple site prophesy. Church leaders have since stated that no temple 
would be built on the Berry Knoll property. Warren Jeffs has revealed that he intends to 
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abandon the Short Creek area. (R. 13887-13889*; R. 16448, at pp. 22-23). (See also If 
64(c), above). 
Even if the Berry Knoll property had special economic or religious significance to 
Appellants, it would not change the fact that it is in the best interests of the Trust to sell 
such property. Due to the Trust's severe liquidity crisis, it is critical that the Trust sell 
property. After extensive consideration, it has been determined that the Berry Knoll farm 
is the best-suited property to be sold by the Trust. While the Fiduciary would like to 
accommodate Appellants' concerns, his duty is to the Trust - not Appellants. The 
Fiduciary cannot sacrifice the interests of the Trust in order to satisfy Appellants' desires. 
The Fiduciary is not aware of any feasible alternative. Appellants have not identified 
an alternative. (Appellants would likely object to the sale of any property of the Trust). 
Next, Appellants complain that the Fiduciary is proposing to sell the property to a 
"competing religious group". In truth, the proposed buyer is not a religious group, but a 
limited liability company. The Fiduciary has not inquired as to the religion of the owners 
of the company - as it would be inappropriate to do so. It would not be proper for the 
Fiduciary to sell, or refuse to sell, based upon religion. Appellants intimate that the Trust 
should refuse to sell the property to the proposed buyer because Appellants find its owners' 
religion distasteful. 
The Fiduciary's willingness to sell the property to this particular buyer is not based 
upon religion. Rather, such willingness is based upon one reason: the buyer is willing to 
buy the property. No one else has made an offer to buy the property from the Trust. 
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Moreover, there is nothing stoppling Appellants from obtaining the property because 
the sale is subject to better offers. If the property is truly significant to Appellants, they 
may purchase it by offering more money. 
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Appellants' motion to intervene is untimely and procedurally defective. 
Appellants have failed to identify the scope of their intended intervention and have been 
inconsistent with respect to the matters for which they seek authorization to intervene. It 
is a black letter legal principle that the members of a beneficiary class lack standing to 
enforce a charitable trust. Although there is an exception to such principle, the exception 
is rare and does not apply here. Appellants cannot establish any of the factors necessary 
to meet the exception: the beneficiary class is not small and strictly defined; the requested 
intervention would result in vexatious litigation to the Trust; and Appellants cannot show 
that the AGs have been absent or ineffective in this case. Appellants have no special claim 
or interest in Trust property which would distinguish them from the other members of the 
class or which would afford standing in this case. The Court properly denied the motions 
to intervene. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
L The Motions to Intervene Were Untimely, 
"The first requirement under [Rule 24] is that the intervenor make 'timely 
application.'" Republic Ins. Group v. Doman. 774P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989). In the 
present case, Appellants did not apply to intervene until May, 2009, four years after the 
Trust Probate Action was commenced and two-and-a-half years after the Court's final, non-
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appealable reformation judgment was entered.22 It was also nine months after Appellants 
first began filing motions in the Trust Probate Action and six months after the Court ruled 
that Appellants have no standing (which ruling was not appealed). Appellants' motions to 
intervene were untimely. 
II. The Motions to Intervene Were Procedurally Defective. 
Rule 24(c) provides that a motion to intervene "shall be accompanied by a pleading 
setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." In the present case, the 
motions of Appellants were not accompanied by an intervention complaint, or any other 
"pleading" {see Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a)). Furthermore, Appellants have failed to set forth "the 
claim or defense for which intervention is sought." 
HI. Appellants Have Failed to Identify the Scope of Their Requested Intervention. 
Compliance with the requirements of Rule 24(c) is not a mere technicality, but is 
absolutely essential for the Court to make an informed decision on an application for 
intervention.23 In the present case, Appellants failed to identify or explain the scope of their 
anticipated intervention. Are Appellants seeking a limited, single-issue intervention? Or, 
are they trying to intervene generally as to all matters in the case? The filings of Appellants 
22
 "Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of 
judgment." Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983) (holding 
intervention application filed within 11 days after applicant learned of judgment untimely). 
23
 The planned scope of intervention is one of the critical factors in determining 
whether a litigant meets the "special interest" exception to the general rule that charitable 
trust beneficiaries lack standing. The court must consider whether the litigant seeks only a 
one-time challenge to a particular act, or seeks to continually interfere with on-going trust 
administration. Hooker v. Edes Home. 579 A.2d 608, 614 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990; Robert 
Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation. Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1028 (Ariz. App. 
2004). (See Part V, below). 
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are not clear on the matter, and indeed appear inconsistent.24 Similarly, Appellants' filings 
appear inconsistent with respect to their alleged status as representatives of other members 
of the beneficiary class.25 Having failed to clarify such matters, and having failed to comply 
with Rule 24(c), Appellants are not entitled to intervene in this case. 
IV. As Members of a Charitable Trust Beneficiary Class, Appellants Lack Standing. 
It is a well-accepted legal rule that, subject to one rare exception, the members of a 
beneficiary class of a charitable trust do not have standing to enforce the trust.26 At 
common law, the "exclusivity rule" provides that the Attorney General has primary, and 
nearly exclusive, standing to enforce a charitable trust (see Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 
608, 611-12 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990)).27 The only parties with standing under the common 
24
 In places, (where is it to their advantage to so argue), Appellants suggest that they 
seek intervention on a limited basis - to challenge an alleged fundamental act. (See 
Appellants' Brief, at p. 32 ("Selling Berry Knoll is precisely the type of fundamental act that 
. . . 'will only be litigated once'")). In other places, Appellants seek to litigate numerous 
different issues, including on-going administration of the Trust. (See e.g. <J 53, above). 
25In places, they claim to be representative of thousands of church members and the 
"vast majority" of beneficiaries. (Appellants' Brief, at pp. 17,24). In other places (when it 
is to their advantage) they claim to be unique and distinct from the other members of the 
beneficiary class. (Id at 30). Appellants have never sought to certify a class under Rule 23, 
and have never complied with the requirements which would allow them to appear as 
representatives of a class. 
26
 See Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation. Inc.. 91 P.3d 1019, 
1028 (Ariz. App. 2004); Indianapolis Humane Society v. The Humane Society of 
Indianapolis. Inc.. 829 N.E.2d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State ex rel. Nixon v. 
Hutcherson. 96 S.W.3d 81, 84 (Mo. 2003); Weaver v. Wood. 680 N.E.2d 918, 923 (Mass. 
1997); Hooker v. Edes Home. 579 A.2d 608,615 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990); and Alco Gravure. 
Inc. v.Knapp Foundation. 479 N.E.2d 752,755 (N.Y. 1985); Kania v. Chatham. 254 S.E.2d 
528 (N.C. 1979). 
27
 The primary purpose of the exclusivity rule, and a major factor in considering the 
exception to the rule, is to protect the trust property and leadership from vexatious litigation. 
(See Hooker. 579 A.2d at 612-15; Alco Gravure. 479 N.E.2d at 756; Kania. 254 S.E.2d at 
-42-
law are (i) the Attorney General, (ii) co- trustees, and (iii) persons who qualify under a rare 
"special interest" exception. (See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 391). The Utah Trust 
Code modified this rule by adding one more party to the list of those with standing: the 
settlor. (See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-405(3) ("The settlor of a charitable trust, among 
others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.").28 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Appellants are members of the beneficiary 
class. Accordingly, unless they qualify under the rare "special interest" exception 
(discussed below), they lack standing as a matter of law.29 
530). 
28Contrary to Appellants5 assertion, the District Court's ruling is not in conflict with 
the "among others" language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-405(3). The comments to the 
uniform statute and the Restatement of Trust reveal that the term "others" includes the 
Attorney General, co-trustees, and persons with a special interest - and does not include the 
members of the beneficiary class. 
29
 Appellants have misconstrued and mischaracterized the District Court's ruling with 
respect to such matters. (See Appt. Brief, at pp. 2,22,25). Contrary to Appellants' assertion, 
the Court did not rule that "no one besides the state can participate as a party under any 
circumstances." (Id. at p. 2). Rather, the Court found that the Utah and Arizona Attorney 
Generals and the Fiduciary are the only ones with standing in this particular case. The Court 
did so after noting the "black letter law" that potential beneficiaries of charitable trusts have 
no standing, and after finding that the present Appellants in this case are not "uniquely 
situated" and do not have "particularized interests." (Corrected Ruling, dated July 17,2009, 
at pp. 1-2). Thus, contrary to Appellants' assertion, the District Court did not find that the 
Attorney General has exclusive standing in all cases involving charitable trusts filed at any 
time, nor did it deny the existence of the "special interest" exception. It merely found that 
the present Appellants did not meet such exception. 
Moreover, the District court stated in its July 17,2009, Order that it expressly relied 
upon and incorporated by reference the analysis of the Arizona Attorney General in a 
Memorandum, dated June 9, 2009 (a copy of which is included in the addendum). (See 
Order, at p. 2). The Arizona Attorney General's Memorandum, at pp. 3-6, contains a 
thorough discussion of the "special interest" exception and a persuasive showing as to why 
these particular Appellants do not meet the exception. The Court recognized the existence 
of the "special interest" exception. It just did not apply to these Appellants in this case. 
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V. Appellants Do Not Meet the "Special Interest" Exception. 
The "special interest" exception is a rare30 and limited31 exception to the general rule 
of non-standing to charitable trust beneficiaries. 
Courts have identified a number of factors which must be present before the exception 
applies.32 Appellants cannot meet any of the required factors. 
First, Appellants must show that the beneficiary class is small The class must be 
"sharply defined" and "limited in number." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 614. This factor is not 
met in the present case as the UEP Trust has a very large class (believed to consist of over 
10,000 members), which is not sharply defined or limited in number. 
Next, Appellants must show that their proposed litigation would not expose the Trust 
to vexatious litigation. They must show that they are intervening for a limited, one-time 
purpose of challenging an act which is extraordinary and fundamental, as opposed to 
challenging acts of ordinary discretion or ongoing administration of the Trust. (See 
Schalkenbach, 91 P.3d at 1029; Hooker. 579 A.2d at 614-17). 
3
 See Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through 
a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 Cornell J. L & Pub. Pol'y 1,45 (2009) (the exception 
applies "only in the most unusual circumstances"); Brady, From the Dead Hand to the 
Living Dead: the Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1183, 1199 
(2007) ("standing is rarely granted"). 
31
 Where a litigant is permitted standing under the special interest exception, such 
standing is allowed for the enforcement of the particular special interest only - not for 
general enforcement of the trust. (5 Scott & Asher on Trusts (5th ed.) § 37.3.10 at p. 2443-
44). 
32
 See Schalkenbach. 91 P.3d at 1026; Bjasko, Standing to Sue in the Charitable 
Sector, 28 U.S.R L. Rev. 37, 61 (1993); Hooker. 579 A.2d at 614. 
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In the present case, Appellants have failed to meet this test. Appellants have failed to 
explain the scope and purpose of their proposed intervention, and their filings are 
inconsistent on this issue. Even so, Appellants cannot be challenging anything 
extraordinary or fundamental in this case. At the present time, there is nothing pending in 
the Trust Probate Action which involves fundamental or extraordinary actions.33 
Appellants attempt to characterize the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll farm as a 
"fundamental" event. In reality, it is not. The proposed sale consists of vacant, unimproved 
ground, and comprises only a small fraction of the Trust's property. This sale is an 
exercise of the Fiduciary's ongoing management discretion - to liquidate a small portion 
of property in order to pay the Trust's financial obligations. 
From reviewing Appellants' filings, it is clear that they do not intend to limit 
themselves to challenging fundamental acts. On the contrary, they seek to challenge the 
discretionary decisions of the Fiduciary and the ongoing Trust administration. Allowing 
standing for such purposes would devastate the Trust with additional vexatious litigation. 
Next, Appellants must show the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the 
Fiduciary or the Court. {See Schalkenbach, 91 P.3d at 1026). This Appellants cannot do 
- as there has been no fraud or misconduct in any way.34 
33
 This is in contrast to 2005 and 2006 years, when the Trust was reformed. Certainly, 
reformation was an extraordinary and fundamental event. However, given that the 
reformation was completed in 2006, and was not appealed, such matter has been finally 
decided and provides no basis for intervention at this late date. 
34
 Appellants have attempted to meet this test by citing to two different legal actions 
which have been brought against the Fiduciary. {See Appellants'. Memo, at 14-15).] Such 
actions, however, are wholly frivolous and outrageous, constitute an abuse of the legal 
system, and should not be given any weight by this court: 
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Next, Appellants must show that the Attorney General is unavailable or ineffective in 
enforcing the Trust. (See Schalkenbach, 91 P.3dat 1026). Appellants clearly cannot make 
such a showing - notwithstanding Appellants' scathing criticisms of the Attorneys General. 
(Appt Brief, at 27). Bombast is not a substitute for factual analysis. The record clearly 
shows that both of the AGs have been active and effective participants throughout the Trust 
Probate Action and have assured that the actions of the Court and the Fiduciary have been 
in accordance with the law and in the best interests of the Trust. Appellants nowhere 
explain how the legitimate interests of the Trust have not been protected, either by the 
Fiduciary or by the AGs. 
The fact that the AGs have not jumped to meet every whim and demand of Appellants 
does not mean that they are derelict in their duties. Since 2008, the AGs have investigated 
numerous accusations and allegations of Appellants and, time and time again, have found 
them to be without merit. The AGs' refusal to fulfill the unreasonable, unrealistic, and 
unlawful demands of Appellants does nothing to strengthen Appellants' standing argument. 
Similarly, to the extent Appellants are upset that their illegal practice of forced marriages 
We give little, if any, weight to . . . allegations of fraud because any 
plaintiff can allege such misconduct, regardless of the merits of the 
complaint. If we found that mere allegations of grave misconduct were 
sufficient to confer standing, the purposes of limiting standing to 
protect trustees from vexatious litigation would be undermined. 
Schalkenbach, 91 P.3d at 1026 n. 7. Furthermore, regardless of the merits of such legal 
actions, they do nothing to afford standing to these Appellants in this case. Appellants are 
not parties to such actions, were not the "victims" of the alleged misconduct, and their 
present attempt to intervene is not related to such misconduct. {See 5 Scott & Asher on 
Trusts (5th ed.) § 37.3.10 at p. 2443-44). (special interest standing is limited to enforcement 
of the special interest only)). 
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of child brides has been curbed by the Reformed Trust, Appellants have no right to 
complain.35 
Finally, Appellants have failed to show that their situation is unique in any relevant 
way which would distinguish them from the other members of the beneficiary class. Three 
of the Appellants allege that they have a special interest in the Berry Knoll property because 
they received "stewardships" to use such property from the former trustees. This is not a 
distinguishing factor. There are numerous members of the beneficiary class who received 
stewardships (i.e. permission) to use Trust property in the past.36 Two of the Appellants 
claim a special interest by virtue of their positions as bishops in the FLDS Church. Such 
positions, however, do not give any legally enforceable interests in the property of the Trust 
- whether under the 1998 Restated Trust Declaration or the Reformed Trust Declaration.37 
35
 One of the protections that FLDS leadership sought through the conversion of the 
UEP into a charitable trust was the right to evict persons from the land whom Church 
leadership determined did not qualify for charitable benefits. See United Effort Plan Trust 
v. Holm. 209 Ariz. 347, 101 P.3d 641, 643 (Ariz. App. 2004) (former trustees brought 
forcible detainer action against family living on UEP land after mother revoked her consent 
to the marriage of her 15 year-old daughter to a 39 year-old married man). 
36
 Furthermore, the receipt of a stewardship does not give any legally enforceable 
claim or interest in property. The 1998 Restated Trust Declaration made it clear that the 
trustees had sole power and discretion over the Trust's property and could grant or revoke 
permission to use such property at will (See ^ 4, above). The Reformed Trust Declaration 
did not change this. 
37
 In the past, some bishops of the FLDS Church were made trustees of the Trust, and 
therefore had the authority to administer Trust property, including granting and revoking 
permission to use Trust property. Such authority, however, was based upon the fact that they 
were trustees of the Trust. There is nothing about the former Restated Trust Declaration 
which gave any authority, claim or interest to the position of church bishops. Rather, all 
control over the Trust was reserved to the trustees. Similarly, there is nothing about the 
present Reformed Trust which would give bishops any special interest in the Trust. 
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The District Court properly found that Appellants failed to satisfy the strict "special 
interest" exception to the Rule of Standing. 
VI. Appellants Cannot Invoke Intervention as a Means of Avoiding the 
Consequences of Their Willful Choices. 
Despite having indisputable notice of all on-going proceedings, Appellants chose not 
to appear or be heard when the Trust was reformed. They failed, timely or otherwise, to 
appeal the final order of reformation. Hundreds of individuals have relied on the provisions 
of the Reformed Trust to make critical decisions governing their lives. 
Yet, after having sat silent for years, Appellants sought to intervene, take over the 
Trust administration, get rid of the Fiduciary, and presumably undo everything done in the 
case to date, upsetting all settled expectations that final judicial orders really are final 
judicial orders. Appellants' efforts were inexcusably late. Intervention was properly 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly denied Appellants' motions to intervene. 
Dated: July 14, 2010 CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Jeffrey L. Smems, Attorneys for 
Appellee, Bruce R. Wisan, as the Court-
Appointe^Special Fiduciary of the 
UniiMhffort Plan Trust 
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A. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 24(a) 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-405(3) 
C. Corrected Ruling and Order on Pending Motions, dated July 17,2009 
D. Decision and Order Granting the Fiduciary's Motion to Compel, The Fiduciary's 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel, and Denying Movants' Emergency Motion to Stay 
Sale of Trust Property, dated Nov. 10, 2008 
E. Memorandum in Opposition to Movants' Motion to Stay Proceedings, to Replace 
Special Fiduciary, and to Enjoin Further Actions of Special Fiduciary Pending 
Evidentiary Hearing, dated June 5, 2009 
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Rule 24 Page 1 of 1 
Rule 24. Intervention. 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute 
confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of 
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order 
administered by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made 
pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in 
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The 
motions shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which 
intervention is sought. 
(d) Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances. 
(d)(1) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute in an action in which the Attorney General has not appeared, 
the party raising the question of constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of such fact. The court shall permit the 
state to be heard upon timely application. 
(d)(2) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a county or municipal ordinance in an action in which the county or 
municipal attorney has not appeared, the party raising the question of constitutionality shall notify the county or municipal 
attorney of such fact. The court shall permit the county or municipality to be heard upon timely application. 
(d)(3) Failure of a party to provide notice as required by this rule is not a waiver of any constitutional challenge otherwise 
timely asserted. 
Addendum B 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 75-7-405 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate Code (Refs & Annos) 
*B Chapter 7. Utah Uniform Trust Code (Refs & Annos) 
^1 Part 4. Creation, Validity, Modification, and Termination of Trust (Refs & Annos) 
*•§ 7 5 - 7 - 4 0 5 . Charitable purposes—Enforcement 
(1) A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or 
religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes the 
achievement of which is beneficial to the community. 
(2) I f the terms of a charitable trust do not indicate a particular charitable purpose or beneficiary, the 
trustee, if authorized by the terms of the trust, or if not, the court may select one or more charitable 
purposes or beneficiaries. The selection must be consistent with the settlor's intention to the extent it 
can be ascertained. 
(3) The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2004, c. 89, 5 37, eff. July 1, 2004. 
UNIFORM LAW COMMENTS[UTC § 405] 
The required purposes of a charitable trust specified in subsection (a) restate the well-established 
categories of charitable purposes listed in Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 28 (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, approved 2001), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 368 (1959), which ultimately 
derive from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I , c.4 (1601). The directive to the courts to 
validate purposes the achievement of which are beneficial to the community has proved to be 
remarkably adaptable over the centuries. The drafters concluded that it should not be disturbed. 
Charitable trusts are subject to the restriction in Section 404 that a trust purpose must be legal and 
not contrary to public policy. This would include trusts that involve invidious discrimination. See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 28 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001). 
Under subsection (b), a trust that states a general charitable purpose does not fail if the settlor 
neglected to specify a particular charitable purpose or organization to receive distributions. The court 
may instead validate the trust by specifying particular charitable purposes or recipients, or delegate 
to the trustee the framing of an appropriate scheme. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 397 
cmt. d (1959). Subsection (b) of this section is a corollary to Section 413, which states the doctrine of 
cy pres. Under Section 413(a), a trust failing to state a general charitable purpose does not fail upon 
failure of the particular means specified in the terms of the trust. The court must instead apply the 
trust property in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes to the extent they can be 
ascertained. 
Subsection (b) does not apply to the long-established estate planning technique of delegating to the 
trustee the selection of the charitable purposes or recipients. In that case, judicial intervention to 
supply particular terms is not necessary to validate the creation of the trust. The necessary terms 
instead will be supplied by the trustee. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 396 (1959). 
Judicial intervention under subsection (b) will become necessary only if the trustee fails to make a 
selection. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 397 cmt. d (1959). Pursuant to Section 110 
(b), the charitable organizations selected by the trustee would not have the rights of qualified 
beneficiaries under this Code because they are not expressly designated to receive distributions under 
the terms of the trust. 
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UT ST § 75-7-405 Page 2 of3 
Contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 391 (1959), subsection (c) grants a settlor 
standing to maintain an action to enforce a charitable trust. The grant of standing to the settlor does 
not negate the right of the state attorney general or persons with special interests to enforce either 
the trust or their interests. For the law on the enforcement of charitable trusts, see Susan N. Gary, 
Regulating the Management of Chanties: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law. 21 U. Hawaii L. 
Rev. 593 (1999). 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Former § 75-7-405 related to powers exercisable by joint trustees. 
Laws 2004, c. 89, repealed and reenacted this section, which formerly provided: 
w ( l ) Any power vested in three or more trustees may be exercised by a majority, but a trustee who 
has not joined in exercising a power is not liable to the beneficiaries or to others for the consequences 
of the exercise; and a dissenting trustee is not liable for the consequences of an act in which he joins 
at the direction of the majority of the trustees, if he expressed his dissent in writing to any of his co-
trustees at or before the time of the joinder. 
"(2) I f two or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust, and if any of them is unable or refuses 
to accept the appointment, or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee, the surviving or remaining 
trustees shall perform the trust and succeed to all the powers, duties, and discretionary authority 
given to the trustees jointly 
"(3) This section does not excuse a co-trustee from liability for failure either to participate in the 
administration of the trust or to attempt to prevent a breach of trust." 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 7-405 of the Uniform Trust Code. See Volume 7C Uniform Laws Annotated, 
Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Trusts <0^238 
Westlaw Key Number Search. 390k238. 
CJ.S. Trusts 5 345 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Boqert - The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 530, Survivorship Among Co-Trustees. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Surviving or remaining trustees 1 
1. Surviving or remaining trustees 
Reference to trustees of revocable inter vivos trust that used the plural "us" did not limit power to 
only the jo int trustees, but applied to the joint trustees or the sole surviving trustee, where trust 
provided for surviving joint trustee continuing as sole trustee " [u jpon the death of the survivor of us " 
Perrenoud v. Harman, 2000, 8 P 3d 293, 411 Utah Adv. Rep 25, 2000 UT App 241 , certiorari denied 
13 P 3d 599 Trusts 242 
UT ST § 75-7-405 Page 3 of3 
Revocable intervivos trust set up by husband and wife for their benefit during their lifetimes with any 
remaining assets going to their children from previous marriages, which specifically provided that 
surviving settlor could not change beneficiaries, did not preclude surviving wife, in her capacity as 
sole trustee after husband's death, from revoking trust or selling trust assets, where trust granted 
those powers to trustee. Perrenoud v. Harman, 2000, 8 P.3d 293, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2000 UT 
App 241, certiorari denied 13 P.3d 599. Trusts ^ 59(1); Trusts > 242 
Since husband and wife, as joint trustees of revocable inter vivos trust which held marital residence, 
had power to sell or dispose of residence, and, under statute and express terms of trust, surviving 
joint trustee succeeded to all of the powers exercisable by joint trustees, upon death of wife, 
husband, as sole trustee, had power to sell or dispose of residence. U.C.A.1953, 75-7-405(2). Matter 
of Estate of West, 1997, 948 P.2d 351, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. Trusts ^ 191(1) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 75-7-405, UT ST § 75-7-405 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(c) 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COBRT SAln%zoUNry 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ — & 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
: CORRECTED 
IN THE MATTER OF THE UNITED EFFORT RULING AND ORDER ON PENDING 
PLAN TRUST : MOTIONS 
Case No. 053900848 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
Date: July 17, 2009 
This matter is before the Court on a number of Motions that have been submitted for decision or are 
otherwise ripe for determination. They are (1) Willie Jessop's, Dan Johnson's and Merlin Jessop's Motion 
to Intervene; (2) Lyle Jeffs' and James Oler's Motion to Intervene; (3) Potential Intervenors' Motion to Stay 
Proceedings, to Replace Special Fiduciary and to Enjoin Further Actions of Special Fiduciary Pending 
Evidentiary Hearing; (4) Motion for Expedited Discovery; (5) Special Fiduciary's Motion for Relief to 
Preserve Assets of the Trust; and (6.) Arizona Attorney General's Motion for Partial Lift of Stay. Having 
considered the Motions, the Court rules as follows: 
Motions to Intervene and Proposed Intevenor's Other Motions 
All the Motions to Intervene are DENIED. The Court has previously determined that individuals 
who may be potential Trust beneficiaries have no standing to intervene in this action. The memoranda in 
support of the Motions do not persuade the Court that the proposed Intervenors are uniquely situated or have 
a particularized interest that satisfies the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Categorical 
assertions of interest with respect to Trust property are insufficient to establish a right to intervene under 
Rule 24(a). What proposed Intervenors must show-which they have not-is that they have a legally 
cognizable interest in any Trust property. Any "claim of interest" under Rule 24 must have a legal basis; 
without it, no claimant has a right to a remedy and, therefore, no right to participate in the case as a party.1 
1
 That said, since the inception of this case the Court has agreed to consider comments 
from various non-parties, including interested potential beneficiaries, and has broadly noticed its 
hearings to anyone who is interested. Upon request, the Court has also been willing to include 
such individuals (or their counsel) in its distribution of Court decisions. Those actions by the 
Court should not be understood as anything more than what they are-a courtesy to interested 
individuals and as a way of ensuring that the Court receives relevant input on issues affecting the 
Trust. The Court remains committed to receiving input from non-parties in order for the Court to 
be fully and fairly informed on the issues it must decide. However, the Court's courtesies should 
not be misunderstood to imply that the Court recognizes those individuals as having standing in 
the case. 
In re UEP TRUST PAGE 2 RULING 
It is black letter law that potential beneficiaries of charitable trusts have no right to make claims upon 
such trusts. Because the UEP Trust is a charitable trust, the only individuals with legally cognizable 
interests are the Utah and Arizona Attorneys General (A.G.s) as representatives of the community, and 
the Court-designated Special Fiduciary. The Court reaffirms its prior rulings on standing. The Court also 
relies upon and incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in Section ELa of the Arizona Attorney 
General's Office's Memorandum in Opposition to Movants' Motion to Stay Proceedings, to Replace 
Special Fiduciary, and to Enjoin Further Action of Special Fiduciary.2 Because the Motions to Intervene 
must be denied for lack of standing, the proposed Intervenors' remaining motions are also DENIED. 
Lifting of Stay/Sale of Berry Knoll property 
The Special Fiduciary's Motion for Relief to Preserve Assets of the Trust, and the Arizona A.G. 's 
Motion for Partial Lift of Stay are GRANTED. During the telephonic status conference held on May 27, 
2009, the Court reiterated its position(also expressed during the January 20, 2009 telephonic status 
conference) that the stay of the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm was predicated upon the timely and 
unconditional payment of the monthly fees charged for use or occupancy of UEP Trust property. As 
detailed in the Court's written ruling of June 1,2009, during its off-the-record meeting with all counsel 
on November 14, 2008, the Court was asked to stay the proposed sale of the property and grant the 
various participants a period of time to explore settlement. To induce the Court to take that action, and 
as a show of "good faith" by the FLDS community, the Court was promised that monthly payments of 
approximately $64,000 would be made timely to the Utah A.G. Those payments would then be 
forwarded to the Special Fiduciary and would be used to meet the Trust's financial obligations. However, 
at the May 27th telephonic conference the Court was informed that the promised payments had not been 
forthcoming. In light of that information the Court unequivocally ordered that the unpaid occupancy fees 
be paid "forthwith." Although the payments were five months delinquent, the Court allowed the FLDS 
to catch-up their payments, in full, through two equal installments payable on June 1 and June 15,2009. 
A few days later, on June 1, 2009, the Court issued a written ruling that restated its Order and clarified 
that the payments were to be made unconditionally. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that if the terms 
of its Order were not complied with fully, the stay would be lifted and the Court would promptly proceed 
to consider the proposal to sell the Berry Knoll Farm. 
Notwithstanding the Court's Order, and its further requirement that the Utah A.G. immediately 
forward the payments to the Special Fiduciary for his use in meeting Trust obligations, the payments 
were made "under protest." That designation effectively rendered the funds unusable by the Special 
Fiduciary. Further, the Utah A.G. agreed with FLDS representatives that he would not disburse the 
second payment without FLDS approval. That side agreement is inconsistent with the Court's prior 
Orders. The Court concludes that the promises and representations upon which the stay of the sale and 
litigation were predicated have not been honored. As a result, badly-needed funds have not been available 
2The Special Fiduciary also filed an opposition, asserting that the Trust lacked sufficient 
funds to defend against the Motion. The Special Fiduciary requested a hearing to resolve any 
factual disputes underlying the motions. Because the Motions are resolved on the issue of 
standing, there are no factual issues to resolve. 
In re UEP TRUST PAGE 3 RULING 
to meet the Trust's pressing obligations. Therefore, within two business days of the issuance of this 
Ruling and Order, the Utah A.G. is ordered to deposit with the Court all of the funds received to date 
from/or on behalf of the FLDS. The Court will distribute the funds to the Trust to meet its obligations. 
Additionally, the Court has no choice but to proceed promptly to set a hearing on the proposed 
sale of the Berry Knoll Farm. The hearing will be held on Wednesday, July 29,2009, from 9:00 a.m. to 
noon, in courtroom W-46 at the Matheson Courthouse. Because of the limited seating available in the 
courtroom, and in order to avoid potential disruption of other court hearings at the Matheson Courthouse 
that day, a decorum order for that hearing will be forthcoming shortly. 
Settlement proposals 
The Court has received, and is in the process of reviewing, various settlement proposals that have 
been filed. The Court is also reviewing the comments received by the June 30th deadline. Although the 
Court's review is not yet complete, it is apparent that there remain widely divergent views on what the 
appropriate course of action should be. Because of their roles as community representatives in this action, 
the fact that the Utah and Arizona A.G.s have taken such divergent positions regarding the viability of 
any settlement is of significant concern. The Court is studying all submissions and considering its 
options; the Court will announce its decision(s) as promptly as possible. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated in this Ruling and Order, the various pending Motions to Intervene and all 
other motions brought by proposed Intervenors, are hereby DENIED. 
A hearing on the sale of the Berry Knoll property will take place on Wednesday July 29, 2009, 
between 9:00 a.m. and noon, in W-46 of the Matheson Courthouse in Salt Lake City. 
Within 48 hours of the issuance of this Ruling and Order, the Utah A.G. shall deposit with the 
Court all funds received from/on behalf of the FLDS in connection with this action. The Court will 
assume responsibility for disbursal of the funds to the Special Fiduciary in order to ensure that the Trust's 
financial obligations are addressed. 
lb-
SO ORDERED BY THE COURT this/J day of July, 2009. 
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Compel Compliance wrtb Subpoenas Qtaotionitp compel"), brought by Bmce Wijsan in his 
capacity as Special Fiduciary (the <fFid]ic?aty") of the United Bffptf Plan Trust (the "Tnwt"); (2) 
the Fiduciary'? Motion to Disqualify tjw law fiim of S#ow, Christensen & Marfineau ("SC&M") 
mid atfprney Rodney Parker from representing parties in any matters y&yetse to the Trust; and (3) 
an Emergency Motion to Stay Sales of | W Property (the "Emergency Motion") brought by %ee 
individuals ("Movants") claiming an interest in lYustproperty because of their membership in the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ if Latter-pay Satuts ("FLDS Church") and their present, 
albeit unauthorized, use of certain Trust! property,1 
f2, At the| end of fee hearing the Coiurt made oral rulings GRANTING the Fiducizuy's Motion 
^ov^nts sre three individuals^tyillie Jessop, Dan Johnson, and Merlin Jessop-who 
presumably, are active FLDS membersMtbougb they do not claim to be official representatives 
•of the FLDS Church, Nevertheless, in several submissions to this Court Movants have included 
statements to the effect tipat they are acsing "on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated,4' The Court rejects Movants7 Mggestiou that they represent any persons other than 
themselves, This is not a class action lawsuit In any event, because the Trust qualifies as a 
charitable tmst, the only individuals cl&my authorized by lawto represent potential Trust 
beneficiaries are the Attorneys Generafpf Utah and Arizona.' 
r - J -
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to Compel, GRANTING fte Fiduciary's Motion to Disqualify SC&M* and DENYING AS MOOT 
the Movants' Emergency Motion., Alternatively, the Court DENIES the Emergency Motion on 
the basis that the Movants lack standing to request relief* 
•p The Court asked the Fiduciary's counsel to prepare orders memorialing the Courts 
judgment- After reviewing the proposed orders submitted by the Fiduciary the Court determined 
that a more thorough emanation of the reasoning underlying its rulings was appropriate. This 
Decision and Order expands ^ nd clarifies the legal analysis supporting the Court's judgment as 
announced on October 8. In addition to the analysis provided herein, the Court b&s also relied 
upon additional analyses offeredin the various submissions by the Fiduciary and the Attorneys 
General of Utah and Arizona. To the extent those submissions are consistent with the Court's, 
rulings- herein, the Court adopts them by reference, 
Fiduciary's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas2 
lf4 SC&M, joined by attorney Raymond Scott Berry, has opposed the Fiduciary's motion Jo 
compel and has resisted subpoenas issued by the Fiduciary on the grounds that the subpoenas
 t 
violate attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.3 Specifically, SC&M and-
Mr. Beny (collectively referenced as SC&M), have raised the following arguments: (a) that the 
Trust is incapable of holding an attorney-client privilege, (b) th&t the Fiduciaiy is not a successor 
to the prior trustees of the Trust, and (c) that even if the Fiduciary can assert the attoipey-client 
privilege as a successor to the prior trustees, the subpoenas are overbroad, 
1|5 The Court reject$ SC&M's claim that the Trust is not an "entity" capable of holding the 
attorney-client privilege under Utah R~ Evidence 504, SC&M's argument is based upon an 
unduly crapped reading of R.504. By its terms> Subsection (a)(1) of Rule 504 is drafted broadly 
to encompass an association, or other organization or entity i\\vx is rendered legal sendees or 
?Thia section of this Decision and Order is identical in substance to the analysis presented 
in the Court's Decision and Order Granting the Special Fiduciary's Motion to Compel 
Compliance with Subpoenas, filed October 24,2008, m Case No- 060908716, 
3As noted in the Fiduciary's Reply memorandum (and #gain in Court fhmug oraj 
argument), SC&M never responded to the Fiduciary's legal analysis supporting his assertion that 
the documents referenced in the subpoenas would, in any event, be discoverable under the jomt 
client exception to the attorney client privilege, see Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(5). Similarly, other 
than a general reference to the attorney work-product doctrine, SC&M failed respond to the 
Fiduciary's assertion that bis need for the documents fell within the exception to the attorney 
work-product doctrine, Utah R. Civ, P. 26(b)(4). Accordingly, the Court finds SC&M has 
abandoned those arguments us grounds for objecting to thp subpoenas. 
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consultation with a yiew to, obtaining legal services, This language is broad enough to 
accommodate trusts Moreover, Subsection (c) of the Rule acknowledges that the privilege may 
be claimed by the client or the client's representatives, including a guardian, conservator, 
successor trustee, or "similar representative of a cqrporation, association or other organisation, 
Whether or not in existence," The Court concludes that the Fiduciary is a "similar representative" 
within the meaning of R 504. 
$5 SC&M's argument is wholly undermined by prior actions it has taken in the course of its
 a 
longtepresentation of the UBP Trust and of the PXJ^SjChurdu During that time, SC&M and Mr> 
Parker filed several "actions on behalf of the Trust as the sole named Plaintiff/1 In another case 
litigated by jSC&M on behalf of the Trust and tlje then-trustees pf the Trust, the Trust itself was 
represented by Mr. Bepy? while the trustees- of the Trust were separately represented by Mr, 
Parker.5 SC&M, Mr Parker, mi Mr, Bony have* by their own actions, acknowledged the Trusts 
capacity to sue and to retain counsel to represents in various courts. 
ft Further support for the Cpurt's conclusion that the Trust is capable of securing legal 
representation in its own right xs found in the many contexts in which the Utah Code has explicitly 
recognized and defined a trust as a "person" or "entity" for legal purposes.** Additionally, even the 
1998 Trust (on which much of SC&M's argument relies) states that the Trust is "the legal entity" 
established to operate a "religious and charitable trust" under the direction of a Board of Trustees. 
Having so clearly demonstrated their understanding that the Tmist is an entity capable of receiving 
legs! representation, jSC&M, Mr. Parker, and Mr. 3erry are now estopped from asserting a 
contrary argument. 
18 SC&M also argues that even if the Trust is capable of holding 'the attorney client privilege, 
this Court's reformation of the Trust in 2006 has so &ndamentally_altered the Trust as redrafted in 
4
 £g„ United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm, 209 Ark, 347, 101 P.3d 641; United Effort Plan 
Trust y Chatyin, CV-04-S3 (Superior Coipt, Mojave County, Az, filed Jan. 29,2004), afpdin 
part, rev'dinparU CA-CV 04-0647 (Az. Ct App, Division One, filed Nov, 08,2005). 
^UnitedEffort Plan, et ah, V. Stubbs, etaU Case No, 89-2850 (Consolidated case nos. 
930500305 QT and 930501020 CV), Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah 
(m^m, decision, 21 Jan. 2000), on remand following the Utejh Supreme Court's decision in Jeffs 
u Stubbs. 
*See Utah Code sections cited at note- 2 of the Fiduciary's Reply memorandum in support1 
of the motion to compel. 
^~ 
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1998 by Mr, Parker ("the, 1998 Restatement^ *7 that it cannot >e considered a continuation of the 
1998 Trust. While there is greater merit to this argument, the'Court ultimately concludes that it, 
too, fails, 
f 9 In 20Q5, at the request of the Attorneys General of Utah and Arizona, this Court suspended 
the trustees of the Trust, The Court acted after finding that the then-trustees had violated their 
fiduciary duties to the Trust and its beneficiaries. Among othpr things, the Court fouftd that the 
suspended trustees had failed to defend in various lawsuits filed against the Trust-thereby 
exposing the Trust to the possibility that default judgments would be entered against it,* 
^10 The suspension of trustees left the Court with an immediate need for assistance in 
administering the Trust and in collecting and preserving Trust1 assets. Thp Court appointed Bruce 
Wisan as Special .Fiduciary to administer the Trust and granted hrm broad authority to act under 
the Court's oversight. The Fiduciary took over the very same trust that the suspended trustees had 
overseen^ Thus, iSC&M's argument is at least partially flawedr&e Fiduciary's authority was 
established oyer the Trust in the form it existed at the time the trustees were suspended and 
removed-tbat ip, as it existed under the terms of theJ99$ Restatement. 
f 11 To be sure, the Court thereafter used its authority under the Probate* Code and the common 
law doctrine of cypres to reform the Trust. At that lixno tlie Cjourt could have opted to terminate 
the Trust and directed the distribution of the Trust's assets.9 §ut that was not the course the Court 
7The Trust's foundational documents were redrafted fpllowing the Utah Supreme Courts 
decision In Jeffs v. Stubfa, 970 P,2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied sub nom Fundamentalist 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saint? v. Bradshctw, 52$ U.S. 1130 (1999). The Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed with SC&M*s argument that the then-existing Trust was chantable in 
nature. The Jeffs y. Stubbs Court found to the contrary* holding that because it had clearly 
designated j>eneficiaries, it was a private^  trust. The redrafted d^ocument that became the 1998 
Restatement eliminated designated beneficiaries and restated the drafters' intent that the UEP 
Trust qualify as a charitable tru# under Utah law. 
.^ The Court also found that tire, suspended trustees had jcommitted other breaches of trust, 
including, but not limited to, felling to administer the Trust with reasonable care and caution, 
failing to account for Trust assets, feiling to segregate assets tfetwpen charitable and private 
beneficiaries, and failing to appear m Court when ordered to do so, 
^According to Utah Probate Code §75-7-413, "if a particular charitable purpose becomes 
unlawfiil, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful," &e trust does not foil, in whole or 
fin part, nor does the trust property revert to the settlor or the settlor's successors. Rather, at its 
discretion the Court may apply cypres to modify or terminates trust. Aa stated above, the Court 
~4" 
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chose to fpUow. Rather, the eoWpmptyedwid reformed the Trust so as to maintain its 
legitimate charitable purpose to "provide fox Church members according to their pnst] wants and* 
their needs,.. ,"10 See MemorandumDecision, Pecemter 13,20051 The Court disagree '^with 
SC&M's suggestion tbntthe only thing jhe reformed Tm$: has in compion. with the Trusttfwt 
operated under the 1998 Restatement is the Trust res. The reformed *£rost continues the charitable 
mission that was clearly stated' as a goal of the 1998 Restatement and provides a proper and 
appropriate mechanism to fntfiU that p r^jjose,1* See Reformed Declaration of Trust of the United 
Effort Plan Trust, filed August 31,200(5,* 
Tfl2 The pourt does agree with SC^M that the Fiduciwy is not a successor tfn^tee. The 
Probate Code makes separate reference to, and grants authority for, the appqintment of special 
fiduciaries and trustees, Clearly, nnderthe.Code the two roles are not identical* That said, the 
Probate Code grants courts great flexibility in defining the role of the fiduciary, in this case, Ifix. 
Wissn, as Fiduciary, Has been appointed by this Court and has been given broad authority to 
administer the Trmt xxtiSi swh time as "&e Co\ut finals its oversight af the Tmst and appo&foa 
permanent Board of Trustees., In sum and substance, the duties ^ responsibilities that die Court 
has established for the Fiduciary are ckjsely analogous to—if not virtually indistinguishable 
£ora~the duties and responpibiKtiefrthat a trustee would haye in administering the,Trttst The 
Fiduciary i& the person empowered to 'act' for the"Trust in all aspects of its administration until 
decided that the legal purposes-of the "EJEP Tfust could be maintained by reforming % Trust 
wUnder Utah Code §75-7-404, "[a] t w t may be created only to the extent its purposes 
are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to pctyeve," To the extern: that any part of 
the Trust under the 1998 Restatement supported purposes that Were not lawful (e,g„ polygamy 
underage marriages), those portions of.the restated Trust would have bepn void ab initio. 
Therefore, in eliminating those aspects* of the Trupt that we?e legally problematic, the Court 
simply implemented the presumed lawful intentions qf tlie Tnist settlorO), 
nSC#M'$ argument conflates the role qf the UEP Trustee with that of the PLPS Church 
leadership. While it is true that between 1998 and 2005 the same individuals held both positions, 
that'does not mean that the two roles and functions cannot be separated without undermining the 
legal and legitimate charitable purposes of the Trust. Indeed, as the Court's Memorandum 
Decision of December 13,2005 shows (in its. section by section analysis of the 1998 Restatement, 
from the face of the document itself one can discern thattwo Separate, if-closely related, entitle^ 
are contemplated-the United Effort Plan (the "Plan"), and an accompanying Trust The Plan was 
intended to operate tjnder the priesthood direction qf the President of the FLEjg Church.
 x The 
Trust, on the otfae? hand* wap intended to operate under the Erection qf the Bpard^of Trustees, In 
reforming the Trust the Court adopted, Wd gave meaniu&to, the separate areas of authority and 
responsibility already recognized by the 1998 Restatement 
-5-
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such time as the Comt terminate? its oversight. As the U.S. Supreme Court ptated in Commodity 
Future TradingComm'ny. Weintrqub, 471 IT.JS. 343, Z5U52{\98S)/ctiiQ actor whoseduties mosf 
olosely resemble those of management should control the* privilege.• * " Thus, the Court 
concludes tha$ for present purposes, the Fiduciary fc the appropriate individual to invoke and 
exercise the attorney-client privilege anfeebalfpf the Trust,1* 
513 The Court is not persuaded by gC&M's argument that the Fiduciary in this case must be 
viewed differently because, he is in an adversarial position to the prior trustees of the Trust. It is 
.true that successor trustees are generally'not at odds with the trustees they replace, but that is not 
always the case. If a prior trustee has committed a breach of fiduciary duty erach that the trustee fe 
replaced* the successor trustee has a duty to pursue vigorously claims against the prior trustee, hi 
this case the Fiduciary is doing no mom than tyoultf he expected of a successor trustee who-found 
himself in an analogous situation Moreover, to accept the position urged by SC&M-that is, that 
the privilege should be4eemed personal to.the prior trustees-who had originally engaged the 
firm's service$~WQUld place unreasonable hurdle to any successor's ability to fulfill his fiduciary 
duties. The result would be that the interests of the true alienWbe trust-would suffer injury. 
Such a result is inconsistent with the policy purposes that the ajtomey-cKent privilege was devised 
to protect. 
Tf 14 Finally, the Court has reviewed the subpoena requests and finds that they are 
circumscribed to requesting* information directly relevant to the administration of the Trust, or to 
identifying assets that may be properly claimed by the Trust in satisfaction of judgments entered 
in its behalf Accordingly, the Court grants the Fiduciary's motion to compel compliance with the 
subpoenas, 
Motioq to Disqualify J5C&M from Representing Parties in"Any jMattera Adverse to the Trust 
fl 5 "A pariy wishing to disqualify opposing counsel under JTJtah'Rule of Professional 
Conduct] 1.9 must demonstrate three facfors; (I) that a previous attorney-client relationship arose 
with the moving party; (2) that the present Iitigatiou is "substantially factually related" to the 
^Although the factual contexts pre not identical, the Court finds support for its 
conclusion in the Supreme Court's decision in Weintraub, (holding that a bankruptcy trustee had 
the power to waive the debtor corporation's privilege with respect to the communications that 
took place prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition) and California Supreme Court's decision 
in Moeller v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4Jh 1124,947 P 2d 279 (1997) (holding that the powers of a 
trustee are not personal to any particular trustee but, rather are inherent in the office of trustee, «A 
successor trustee has all the powers of that ogjpe, including the power to assert the attorney 
client privilege ns tP confidential communications between a predecessor trustee and an attorney 
providing seryices to the tinst). 
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previous representation; and (3) that the1 attorney's present client's interests are materially adverse 
to frvmovrnt." Poly Software Intl /*c> v. YuSv, 880 U Supp/1487,149fr(D. Utah 1995),13 
%l6 For the reasons stated in the preceding section, the Court rejects SC&M's argument that it 
did not establish an attorney-client relationship with the Trust/The Court ateo rejects SC&M*s 
argument that the Trust it represented under fftej 998- Restatement is 3orfhndamentally different 
from the 2006 Reformed Trust that the two cannot be considered the same plient fpr purposes of 
the attorney-client privilege. The Court has also held that the Fiduciary is the person presently 
authorized to invoke and exercise the .attorney-client privilege on behalf of the Trust, The issue, 
now is whether SC&M's broad-based and lepgihy representation of tbs Trust mandates its 
disqualification from representing individuals or entities asserting positions that are materially 
adverse to tfie Trust. 
[^17 The Fiduciary argues fliat SC&JyPs prtop representation and advocacy on behatfof the 
Trust involved matters that are "substantially related1.9 to its present work for the Movants, and {hat 
the Movants* claims are materially adverse to theTrust The Fiduciary argues that under these 
circumstances, Rule 1,9 requires SC&M fo obtain the Fiduciary's -express written informed 
consent before undertaking to rej^esent ^ Movants, because (SC&M h^s not obtained written 
consent from the Fiduciary (on the Trust's fiehalf), SC&M must be disqualified under Rule 1.9. 
The^Conrt agrees* 
•Jl 8 The Court does not take this action lightly. Jt is well aware that ^ disqualification is a 
drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except-when absolutely necessary." 
Memorandum in Opposition to Fiduciary's potion to Disqualify Counsel, at 5 (quoting Fremqn 
y. Chicago Musical Instrument Co,, 689F,2d 715, 721 (7th CJr. 1982)) SC&M W-year history 
representing the Trust on a broad range of issues foundational to the TVust^existencej authority, 
and administration, tpgether with Its role as the Trusf s litigation counsel against persons who 
claimed lights m Trust property, now requires that it bp disqualified from all substantially related 
l3Rule 1.9(a) provides that an attorney may not represept "another person in the 3arae or a 
substantially related matter in which-that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client, unless the former client gives infojmed consent confirmed in writing." 
Subsection (b) of the rule' addresses the ongoing duty pf confidentiality, and prohibits the use of 
ponfidential information obtained during the representation of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, confirmed m'writing. Subsection (c) focuses on the ongoing duty 
of loyalty, and prohibits the use of any in&rrnation obtained during the former representation to 
the disadvantage of the forfner client 
-7-
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matters in which SC&M would advocate position^materjaliy adverse to the Trust14 
$19 Comment 3 to Utah's Rule 1,9 .states that "[mjatters are 'substantially related* for 
purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a 
substantial risk that confidential fectual information as would normally have been obtained in the 
prior representation would materially advance the event's position in the subsequent matter." 
Although Comment 3's reference to patters mvolvfag 'the same transaction or legal depute" 
might suggest a narrow construction to "substantially related** matters, federal case law from the 
District of Utah and the U,& Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit lead the Court to conclude 
that this phrase should not be construed in an unduly narrow fashion. For example, in Poly 
Software, the federal district court noted th&t 
[a] 'substantially factually related matter/ . *, is not defined by any particular, 
discrete legal proceeding. By ih terms, it ipcludes aspects of past controversies 
which are similar, but not necessarily identical, to those encompassed within the 
present dispute, So long as the^e are substantial factual threads connecting the two 
matters, the criteria of Rule 1.9 are met 
880 RSupp, at 1492. 
1f20 InSmitkv. Whatcott, 758F,2d 1098, n0Q(JQ*Cir. 1985), the U. S, Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that "substantiality is present if the factual contexts of the two 
representations are similar or related." The Tenth Circuit elaborated on this issue xaSLCUd, Vv. 
Bradford Group West, Inc., 999 F 2d 4(54,467 (10* Or. 1993), holding that substantiality 
"focusfes] on the factual nexus between the prior and current representations rather than a 
narrower identity of legal issues." Moreover, "if there is a reasonable probability that confidences 
were disclosed which could be used against the client in later, adverse representation, a substantial 
relation between the two cases is presumed," Id , quoting Trone v. Smith, 621 R2d 994, 998X9* 
Cir. 1980). Notably, all three of these cases (Poty Software, Whatcotu andSLCLtti V), the 
federal courts were construing the substantiality requirement under Utah *s Rule 1 ,9, The analyses 
adopted in those decisions are persuasive and will be followed by this Court. 
HMost relevant for present purposes are the many times that SC&M advocated the Trust's 
ownership of property and it§ right to control that property to the exclusion of Wiy interest by 
individuals who may bav? previously contributed to, oy received benefits from, use of such 
property That said, the Court's decision to disqualify SC&M applies more broadly than just to 
those issues presently before the Court; Because of the broad range of issues in which SC&M 
provided legal services to the Trust over its 17 year representation, SC&M should be disqualified 
ftom representing adverse parties on any and all other issues substantially related to those 
encompassed by SC&M's former involvement with the Tnist. 
f *p * 
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|21 Applying the above reasoning to the facts of this case, it is abundantly dear that during the 
17 years that SC&M (and, in paiticidar, Mr. Parker) represented the Trust, SC&M advocated 
positions on matters "substantially factually related" to thope presently at issue before fhi> Court, 
Furthermore, the positions previously advocated by SC&M on beha]f of the Trust are .directly 
contrary to their present arguments on bebalfqf the Movants. For example, SC&M does not 
dfcpute that the 1998 Restatement drafted by Mr, Parker expressly provided that any donations to 
the Tnjjst would be made '^ without any reservation or claim of right and/or ownership," and that 
'W'ofproperty owned by the [Trust] is not and does* not become a right or claim'of anyone who 
may benefit in any way from the Trust/' SC&M, on behalf of the Trust, vigorously litigated this 
position m seyeral cases referenced supra at note 4. In those cases SC&M argued that persons 
using Trust land were "tenants-at-will" an4 their permission to use Trust land could he revoked by 
the Trust at any time. See, e.g., UEP V, HoJnr, UEP y. Chptwin. $ee Exhibits D, E, to Fiduciary's 
Reply Memorandum. 3sfow, in its Memorandum iu Support bf [the Movants'] Emergency Motion 
for Stay of Sale of Trust Property [hereinafter "Emergency Motion"], SC&M argues that the . 
Movants presently hafve] a stewardship from priesthood- leadership" to use Trust land*15 and tfiat 
such use invests them with lights" to seek an injunction against the Fiduciary in order to prevent 
the sale of certain Trust land.16 
|22' After carefully reviewing applicable case law m light of the breadth of SC&M's prior 
representation of the Trust and the arguments it is now making against the Trust, the Court is 
persuaded that the substantiality requirement is- satisfied in that there is "a factual nexus between 
[SC&M's] prior and current representations." 
T[23 In Bodily v. Infermmmtain Health Care Cprpt, 649 F> ISupp. 468 (D, Utah 19&6), the court 
quoted the Tenth Circuit decision in Whatcott as'follows; 
Once a substantial relationship has'been found, a presumption anses that a client 
,sBecause they have never requeste4 authorisation to use Trust property from the 
Fiduciary or this Court, Movants cannot claim any right to use and benefit from Trust land as 
they have admitted doing. Movants7 admissions strongly suggest that they are trespassing upon 
Trust properly and converting assets derived from Trust land, 
^Butsee infra discussion regarding Movants' Emergency Motion. The Court assumes, 
without deciding, that the Moyauts are members of a large and-indefinite class of individuals 
who may be beneficiaries of the Trust, The Court has set-up an orderly and structured process by 
which members of the beneficiary class may request, but ^ n o t Jiecessarily entitled to receive, 
specific benefits from the Trust To date, Movants have chosen not to participate in that process. 
Therefore, their admitted use of Trust property outside the authorised process gives them no 
rights to object to the use or disposition of Trust property. 
-9-
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has indeed revealed facta to the- attorney that require his disqualification. The 
majority of circuits that have considered the issue have held this presumption to be 
irrebuttable. We agreed The presumption is intended to protect chent 
confidentiality as well as to avoid any appearance of impropriety 
64£R Supp. at 473-74 n40 (quoting WhatcottJSl R2d at 1100). 
[^24 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Tronei 
The underlying concern is the possibility, or appearance of the possibility, that the 
attorney may have received confidential information during the prior representation 
that would be relevant to the subsequent matter m which disqualification is sought. 
The test does-not require the former clienUo show that actual confidences were 
disclosed That inquiry would be improper as requiring the very disclosure the 
rule was intended to protect. The inquiry tefo? this reason restricted to the scope 
of thp representation engaged in, by the attorney, It is the possibility of the breach 
of confidence, not the faot of the breach that triggers disqualification. 
Id, at 999 (emphasis added) *7 
$25 Because many of the matters in which SC&M represented the Trust in the past are-
substantially related to SC&M's present representation, there-is an irrebuttable presumption that 
confidential communications were exchanged between SC&M and the Tryst during SC&M's 
lengthy representation. The Court rejects SC&M's suggesnon that the Trust must offer specifics 
about what confidential communications may have been exchanged. As the Trone court stated, "it 
is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact of the breach, that triggers 
disqualification." That standard is jnore than met here Therefore, the Court grants the Fiduciary's 
motion to disqualify SC&M. Absent express written informed consent obtained from the 
Fiduciary, Utah Rr Prof. Conduct 1.9 bars SC&M generally,, and Mr. Parker in particular, from 
representing any parties adverse to the Trust on matters substantially related to the broad range of 
issues covered during their prior representation of the Trust. It also stands to reason that SC&M 
attorneys should be barred from doing indirectly what Rule 1.9 prohibits them from doing 
directly, Were it otherwise, the protection offered by Rule J .9 would be easily circumvented 
Therefore the Court holds that SC&M c'annot consult or advise adverse parties (or their legal 
representatives) on matters substantially related to SC&M's former representation of the Trust., 
17Although some of Trone7$ brpad language about the disqualification of other lawyers in 
a firm once one attorney has been disqualified fras been called into question by subsequent cases, 
the principle for which the Trone decision is cited here is still good law and has been followed by 
other state and federal courts. 
40-
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Emergency Motion to Stay Bale-pfPflijrt Property 
«|26 Movants filed, their.Emergency Motion on Augml.8,200$, asking tbeCourt to e#er an 
.order "staying ail trHnsacfion9.invpivini'UEip T V i » t j ^ p ^ f o r d p e ^ arid further 
that the Court enter an oroVprobibit^ ftom entering totoany binding 
transactions to ,se l lT^ 
providing, moya^ts with 4ioti.ee/ antf an opportunity to-fes lieard^^Memorkndwiin Support of 
Emergency Mo^pn, at 1-2,. Movants also requested that the Court enter a preliminary injunction 
to protect Movants' allege'd^^ti"1*'/**. at 14. 
$27 > jp.oppositfon.totbfc'E^^ 
helated'collateral attack; on/prior deter^niriations'and prdersbf this Court! -Memorandum in 
Opposition to Emergency Motion, at:2*3. 'puoting.f^ovante'own admissions the Fiduciary argues-
thatMovants lack standing to request relief because-they. '"have np e^ojrceabl£rigbts with respect 
ttf.fbe fJYuatan^ cannot, isuff^ r an^ leg^ly-cognizable injury wi^i'r^'ect tQ /#p/tlieietQ." M, at 
10,. in any event; the'Kdueia^ denied "based upon 
waiver^d'imcW^n.hahdig.33 T& at'23. 'Finally, theFi^e i^^g^^^ to the 
Trustee not require him to .request Court approval before gelling or pthenvise disposing of Trust; 
assets. 
|28" The Attorney General of Utah-agreea v^thrthe'Fidijciary tbjat- Movants Jacjc standing to 
tequest relief bemuse tho'Cburt'has deteimined thaithe-Trust is che&itable -to nature." LJtab 
AttoiieyGeii'eraJ^ Objection to $e. Emergency Motion: for/Stay bf Sale^ of Tn?st Property, at3, 
["Utah AG". Objection"]:; Indeed, the Utah Attorney .General argpes thatthe only parties with legal 
standing, to enforcp't^ rms of the' reformed-Trust are the. Attorney^Generaltof Utah arid'Arizona, 
the*Fiduciary,;and, phee ^ signed, theEp'ard^A'GVpbjection,"dx4,- TheUtahAttorneygeneral 
[Utah AG] 4so agrees that ''the Fidijeiatyis'.notpresently uxider m obligation to olDtain'court 
approval on'sales 6r distribution^ of Tm.siproperjy," hut siting tjtaHRdde Ann/§75-l-30?(2)? the 
Utah XG argues that 'the Court ]has]:jurisdiction to limit the power of'the Fi"4uciaiy a^it/debms 
appropriate; 7<^ ' at o, ft^therraore,*>he suggests -there is. merit to reqjflr[ing]'cpurt approval in 
limited :cixcumstahces3"a^hQUgh "[a]ny4imitetion placed by the Court upon the Fiduciary's power 
.... should- be narrow."/^ at 6., JlWutah AG offers certain^ggestiops for the Coxirt to .consider 
if it decides to require that the Fiduciary give.notice regardipgaa antipipated sale or distribution of 
|S]S4 events never explain how theyh^ve acquired £4rightsV*against the Trust -when;they 
themselves; ac^ojvvledge that under the express 'terms' of the 1998>.Restatement twith which they 
agree), their tontributiona o j time or substance were-made 6iwithbut w.reservatiouox cfeim of 
right and/or sOwnership" and; their "ujje'of properly. pTOe3jJy;the'|trUst] is noiand'doesupt 
becom'eVright brpl^im^of-anyonewho.may benefit in any.w^y from1 the.Trust," Seeafyhinfta 
1J31 (Movants!, admission that they had "ho enforceable beneficial-interests!1 in'tbe Trust 
-.U^ 
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Trust property. H, af 7, 
|29 The Arkonq Attorney General argues that the Emergency Motion fails because (1) the-
"type of notice relief they request is within the Court's discretion but not mandatory"; (2) (|any 
attempt^] to challenge the refoimatfon of the [Trust] and the Court's administration of the Treat 
are barrel by the doctrine of laches1'; and (3) the Movants hav^ felled "to establish the 
prerequisites to injunctive relief," An^ona Attorney General's Response to Emergency Motion for, 
gtey of Sales of Trust Property, at i~2 (^ 'Arizona AG Response"]. 
pQ At oral argument, counsel for Movants conceded that the Emergency Motion was 
"probably moot" because Its primary puxpose was to ensure that the Fiduciary not conduct a sale 
of the Berry Knoll property "in secret," and as a result of the October 8 hearing (and the 
Fiduciary's submissions in anticipation of that hearing), that purpose had been accotpplished. The 
Court accepts Movants' concession pnfr therefore Ijolds that the Emergency Motion should be 
dented as moot* However* in the event a reviewing court were to find that the Emergency Motion 
is not moot, the Court alternatively holds that Movants lack standing to assert any claim for relief, 
p 1 In their memorandum in support of the Emergency motion, Movants admit that "|a]s 
participants in a charitable trust in which they had no enforceable beneficial interests, they were 0 
powerless to challenge or change [the Courts decision to remove the prior trustees of the Trust]," 
This admission, is fatal to their Emergency Motion, If this statement was true with respect to any 
claims by potential beneficiaries under,the 1998 Restatement, iUs all the more true under the 
Court's 2006 Trust reformation. As they tbempe)ves recognize, because of its charitably nature 
Movants baYe no legal standing to assert any claim with respect to this Trust. 
|32 This conclusion requires that £he Court correct and clarify certain prior statements it has 
made. Spe, e.g„' Minute Entry of July J 9,200S (the "Minute Entry*!); Memorandum Decision 
dated December 13,2005 (referencing'the Minute Entry). In those earlier rulings the Court used 
language imprecisely and in a way that could lead Mpvants and other interested individuals to 
conclude that they have "standing" to rhalce demands upon the Trust. Specifically, in its Minute 
Entry the Court stated that "all beneficiaries of the UEP3 including those who have brought civil 
actions against then Trust" had "standing" to nominate trustees. Jn reviewing the substance of thpf 
Minute Entry it is evident that the Court's reference to "standing** was unfortunate, and, more to 
the point, was legally incorrect. The Court was focused on encouraging "interested parties"1? to 
,9Por that matter, the phrase "interested parties9* is also a misnomer that should be 
corrected. As with "standing," "party" or "parties" are terms of art th^t are not applicable to 
persons asserting that they are eligible for beneficiary status under the Trust Therefore, going 
forward, those persons who have previously been referenced in these Court proceedings as 
'"interested parties" will now be referred to as "interested individuals." 
^12-
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nominate individuals to a future Board of Trustee^ In the course af doing so the Court misused a 
legal term of art when it stated that "all beneficiaries of theUEP; including those who have 
brought civil actions against the Trusf' bad "standing." "Standing" has a clearly defined meaning 
ra law, and the Court's Minute Entry may have created oonfusion on this matter, If so, the Court 
apologizes for that misstep., The Utah AG correctly no{es that with respect to charitable trusts, 
there are a limited number of parties with "legal standing.5" That does not mean, however, that the 
Court cannot invite other interested individuals tQ participate and/or comment on issues before the 
Court involving fee Trust, That is all that the Court intended to convey by its Minute Entry, 
TJ33 As it did ixi July 2005, the Court-rod the Juducjaty-bave tried through many meaip {e.g., 
mailings, a websjte, and regular Court hearings), to keep interested incjividuals informed of 
developments concerning the Trust, The Court continues to believe that it is advisable and 
appropriate-within reason-to provide various mechanisms through whichmembers of the 
potential beneficiary class can comment on issues involying the Trust and its administration* The 
Court emphasises that this opportunity to comment is not an entitlement, and that the mechanisms 
that the Court may employ from time to time to inform members of the beneficiary class of issues 
related to the Trust and Trust assets are not "set in stone M The fact that, on certain occasions,,the 
Court may employ one or more means for communicating information to interested individuals 
does not mean that the Court is bound to do so on evtery occasion. Additionally, the fact that the 
Court has sought (and in the future may seek) comment ftom interested individuals regarding the 
Trust and it$ administration "does not establish a substantive right to require Court action." Utah 
AG Objection, at 4. 
1[34 Within the bounds of reasonableness, interested individuals should1 have mechanisms, 
available to them through which they can stay informed about major issues involving the Trust. 
That said, there are legitimate reasons why the Fiduciary may, on occasion, decline to announce 
immediately his intent to take certain actions It is -entirely appropriate for the Fiduciary to 
exercise bis best business judgment in determining when a particular issue of Trust administration 
is ready £>r public airing. The history of this case has been that in prior attempts to be 
"transparent" about Trust administration, individuals intent on undermining the work of the Trust, 
the Court, and/or the Fiduciary have u$ed such information as a weapon against the Trust thereby 
causing the Trust to incur unnecessary Josses and/or expense. The Court is satisfied with the 
course of action that the Fiduciary has followed over the past three years to keep tfae Court 
informed of his activities on behalf of the Trust, including his management of Trust assets. The 
Court therefore declines the invitation to impose rigid requirements on how the Fiduciary is to 
discbarge his responsibilities to the Trust 
p 5 The Court specifically rejects any argument that the Court must hold public hearings or 
that the Fiduciary must .seek Court approval prior to any disposition-of Trust property. The Court 
also rejects demands by Movants or other interested individual? to conduct discovery in advance 
of any such actions by the Fiduciary. 
-13-
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| J6 As it stated during #ie October 8,2008 hearing; the Court has no intention to micro-
manage the Trust or tp second-guess every deoipion of the Fiduciary. Nevertheless, the Court 
reserves the right to require that it receive advance notiefe of, and explanation &r, proposals to 
dispose of major Trust assets. The Utah AG suggested that the Court adopt $ threshold value of 
$100,000 before the Fiduciary would be required to obtain Court approval to dispose of IVust 
assets. The Court concludes that the threshold amount suggested by the U&jh &G would 
unnecessarily restrict the Fiduciary's ability to exercise his business judgment on behalf of the 
Trust and would enmesh the Coprt unduly in the day to day administration of the, Trust. As stated 
previously th,e Court h#s been satisfied with the Fiduciary's performance and his efforts to keep
 t 
the Coutyapprised of issues. After considering the matter further, however, the Court concludes ii 
is reasonable to require the Fiduciary to seek advance Court approval of transactions involving 
$500,000 or more m Trust sssets. The Court has considered the other procedural suggestions 
offered by the Ufah AG and concludes tb&t }n those-instances when advance Court apprpval is' 
required, the AG's suggestions are reasonable and can be implemented without imposing 
significant additional burdens upon the Trust. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the suggested 
guidelines for those instances involving disposition of major Trust assets, 
*J37 As a final matter, the agrees with the Fiduciary that the Emergency Motion appears, at 
bottom, to be a collateral attack upon the Court's jurisdiction over and reformation of the Trust, 
The Court further agrees with the Arizona AG that any attempts to challenge the Court's authority 
and jurisdiction over the reformed Trust are barred by laches In this respect t|ie Court adopts by 
references the arguments put forward by the Fiduciary and the Utah and Arizona AGs 
ORDER 
p 8 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Fiduciary'sMbtion to Compel 
Compliance with the Subpoenas, GRANTS the Fiduciary's Motion to Disqualify Sc&M, and 
DENIES A3 MOOT Movants' Emergency Motion, Alternatively, tho Court DENIES the 
Emergency Motion on the ]Wjs that Movants lack standing to request relief 
|39 SC&Mand Mr. Berry shall respond promptly and folly to the subpoenas,20 
140 SC&M and Mr. Parker are disqualified from advising, consulting, or representing any 
Jrtigants adverse to the Trust in any matter that is substantially related to any of the issues on 
which* they previously represented the Trust. 
2flTbe Court & aware that Movants have now filed a motion to stay these Orders pending 
appellate.review* The Fiduciary has notyet had an oppprfunity to respond, so the Court will not 
address that issue here. 
-14-
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|41 This Decision and Order shall suffice as the fin^l expression of the Courtis judgment on 
these issues. Counsel need not submit any'Separate Orders. 
So. Ordered by the Court this 10th day of November, 2008. 
Judge Denise 
-IS-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE UNITED 
EFFORT PLAN TRUST Dated November 9, 
1942, Amended April 10, 1946, and 
Amended and Restated on November 3, 
1998; and its TRUSTEES, including known 
trustees TRUMAN BARLOW, WARREN 
JEFFS, LEROY JEFFS, WINSTON 
BLACKMORE, JAMES ZITTING and 
WILLIAM E. JESSOP a/k/a WILLIAM E. 
TIMPSON and DOE TRUSTEES I 
THROUGH IX. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOVANTS' MOTION TO STAY 
PROCEEDINGS, TO REPLACE SPECIAL 
FIDUCIARY, AND TO ENJOIN 
FURTHER ACTIONS OF SPECIAL 
FIDUCIARY PENDING EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
Civil No. 053900848 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
The Court should deny Movants' Motion To Stay Proceedings, To Replace 
Special Fiduciary, And To Enjoin Further Actions Of Special Fiduciary Pending 
Evidentiary Hearing ("Motion to Stay") because: 
1) Movants' Motion to Stay is an attempt to reargue the Court's previous 
holdings in this matter. 
2) Movants lack standing and are equitably estopped from bringing their 
claims. 
3) Movants' requested relief is procedurally unsound and equitably 
unacceptable. 
I. MOVANTS' MOTION FOR STAY IS AN ATTEMPT TO REARGUE THE 
COURT'S PREVIOUS HOLDINGS IN THIS MATTER. 
a. Movants5 Motion for Stay is actually a Motion for Reconsideration, 
Movants' Motion for Stay is actually a belated motion for reconsideration of the 
Court's November 10, 2008 Decision and Order. In its original Motion for Stay of Sales 
of Trust Property, Movants Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson, and Merlin Jessop asked the 
Court "for an emergency order staying all transactions involving UEP Trust property" 
and "prohibiting the Special Fiduciary from entering into any binding transactions to sell 
Trust property without making such transactions subject to Court approval, and providing 
movants with notice and an opportunity to be heard." (Emergency Mot. for Stay of Sales 
of Trust Property 1-2.) Movants' current Motion for Stay asks the Court to grant 
identical relief: a request to intervene and be heard on the sale of Trust property, stay 
further actions by the Fiduciary, and an evidentiary hearing. (Mot. to Stay 18.) The 
Court should deny Movants' Motion for Stay absent a showing of new facts or legal 
authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier. 
b. Movants' Motion for Stay is a Collateral Attack on the Court's 2006 
Trust Reformation. 
Movants' Motion is another collateral attack on the Court's 2006 Trust 
Reformation. "Issue preclusion," also referred to as "collateral estoppel," prevents 
parties or their privies from relitigating issues which were once adjudicated on the merits 
and have resulted in a final judgment. Brigham Young University v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686 (2005). Movants assert that their "Motion to 
J
 Movants also raise similar - if not identical - arguments in Movants' Motions to 
Intervene. The Movants' arguments are discussed in the Arizona Attorney General's 
Response to Emergency Motion for Stay of Trust Property, and its memorandums in 
opposition to Movants' motions to intervene. This memorandum incorporates by 
reference the arguments made in those papers. 
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Intervene seeks to fill a void." (Mot. to Stay 12-13.) But, Movants' continued 
assertions of standing are simply collateral attacks on the Court's default judgments 
against the previous trustees and reformation of the United Effort Plan Trust ("Reformed 
Trust" or "Trust"). Despite Movants' desire to turn back the clock to before the Trust's 
reformation, their claims are collaterally estopped. See e.g. Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 73 P.3d 325, 332 (2003). 
II. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD ITS PREVIOUS DECISION TO DENY 
THE MOVANTS STANDING. 
Movants allege misconduct by the Fiduciary in the hope that the Court will reverse 
its previous rulings and grant them standing. However, even assuming any of Movants' 
allegations were substantiated, they do not grant Movants standing. Movants do not have 
standing because: (a) at most, they are potential charitable trust beneficiaries; (b) they 
cannot intervene at this stage in the litigation; and (c) their claims are barred by the 
doctrines of laches and promissory estoppel. 
a. Movants Do Not Have Standing as Charitable Trust Beneficiaries. 
The Court's Decision and Order declares that "because of its charitable nature 
Movants have no legal standing to assert any claim with respect to this Trust." (Court's 
November 10, 2008 Decision and Order 12.) The Court's denial of standing is supported 
by public policy and the general common law rule. Rest. 2d Trusts §§ 364, 391 (West 
2009). 
To begin with "suits by a representative of a class of potential beneficiaries should 
aim to vindicate the interest of the entire class and should be addressed to trustee action 
that impairs those interests, not the interests of a given individual." Hooker v. EDES 
Homes, 579 A. 2d 608, 615 (1990). Movants' Motion places their interest over those of 
all other Trust beneficiaries, focusing solely on the proposed sale's effect on their 
revocable religious stewardships. (Mot. to Stay 4, 12-13.) Movants do not claim to 
vindicate the interest of all potential Trust beneficiaries. In fact, Movants assert just the 
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opposite - claiming to represent the interest of only "faithful" FLDS Church members. 
(Id at 4, 10.) 
Furthermore, the public policy behind the decision to limit standing is "the 
avoidance of a multiplicity of lawsuits challenging the trustee's discretionary day-to-day 
administration of the trust." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 614. Giving potential charitable 
beneficiaries the right to challenge the Fiduciary's administrative actions raises the 
danger of the proliferation of wasteful lawsuits. Id. Movants have previously 
demonstrated a tendency to engage in repetitive litigation. Id. Since August 2008, 
Movants have filed Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, 
Emergency Motion to Stay the Sale of Property, two Motions to Intervene, Motion to 
Stay Proceedings, Motion to Replace the Special Fiduciary, Motion to Enjoin Further 
Actions of the Fiduciary Pending Evidentiary Hearing, and a Motion for Expedited 
Discovery. These are just the motions filed in this Court, and does not account for 
Movants' related filings in U.S. District Court, Mohave County, Arizona, and before the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Court should not allow "potential beneficiaries to clog court 
dockets and dissipate trust assets with attacks on ordinary exercises of trustees' 
judgment." Id. at 615. 
Movants argue that they are entitled to a special interest exception to the general 
rule denying them standing, but they do not qualify for such an exception. The party 
claiming the special interest must establish that: (1) he or she is part of a class of potential 
beneficiaries that is sharply defined and limited in number; and (2) the challenge to the 
trustee's actions must be fundamental and not a challenge to the trustee's normal exercise 
of discretion. Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612-16. Movants do not satisfy either of these 
criteria. The Court, in its December 13, 2005 Memorandum Decision, determined that 
the Trust's class of beneficiaries is potentially in the thousands and indefinite. (Court's 
December 13, 2005 Mem. Decision, 13.) The existence of thousands of indefinite 
beneficiaries cannot meet the requirement that the class be sharply defined and limited in 
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number. See Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 64 N.Y.2d 458, 465, 490 N.Y.S.2d 
116, 119, 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1985). 
The sale of Trust property is not of a fundamental nature and outside of the 
Fiduciary's discretion. The proposed sale of Berry Knoll Farm, which by all accounts has 
largely sat fallow for the past several years, is not an "extraordinary measure threatening 
the existence of the trust. . . ." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 614-15. The sale of property is an 
ordinary exercise of discretion on a matter expressly committed to the Fiduciary, 
(Reformed Trust § 5.3.5.) There is no credible allegation that the Trust itself will cease 
to exist if the Berry Knoll Farm is sold. 
Movants' claimed special interest in Trust property is also unenforceable under the 
provisions of the Reformed Trust. (Reformed Trust, §§ 2.4, 4.1, 6.4.9.) Movants now 
claim to seek intervention directly on behalf of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints ("FLDS Church"). (Mot. for Stay 4.) Even assuming Movants' 
allegations are true, membership in a religious sect historically affiliated with the Trust 
does not automatically give Movants standing. Members of a religious sect are not given 
standing in an action where the interest of the members are too general or remote, or are 
otherwise adequately protected. Krauthoffv. Attorney Gen., 240 Mass. 88, 92, 132 N.E. 
865, 866 (1921). Movants' self-proclaimed revocable religious and economic 
stewardships over Trust property are insufficiently remote and too general to establish 
standing. (See Court's November 10, 2008 Decision and Order, 9, f.n. 15.) Moreover, 
Movants have not demonstrated a special interest in the Berry Knoll Farm that can be 
adopted by the Fiduciary or recognized by the Court without violating the Reformed 
Trust's religious neutrality requirement. (Reformed Trust §§ 2.4, 4.1, 6.4.9.) Movants 
do not claim an interest based on any factor apart from their religious stewardships, but, 
granting Movants standing based solely on their alleged religious stewardship over the 
Berry Knoll Farm would contradict the secular terms and intent of the Reformed Trust. 
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Movants'-situation is analogous to the New Jersey case of Larkin v. Wikoff, 72 A. 
98, 75 NJ. Eq. 462 (1907). In Larkin, church members sued to prevent the sale of church 
property. Larkin, 72 A. at 102-03. In denying the church members' claims, the New 
Jersey Court emphasized that the trustees' broad discretion in administering the trust 
afforded them wide latitude in implementing the trust so long as they acted in good faith 
and were "not influenced by improper motives." Id. at 104. Here, there is no evidence 
that the proceeds from the sale of the Barry Knoll Farm will be used for anything other 
than to pay the debts incurred in administering and defending the Trust. 
b. As a general rule individuals are barred from intervention after 
judgment and the Court should not deviate from the general rule at 
this late stage. 
Movants failed to appear prior to the Court's 2006 reformation of the Trust. As a 
general rule, intervention is not permitted after a court has entered judgment. Oster v. 
Buhler, 989 P.2d 1073, 1077, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1999). The Court's 2006 
reformation of the Trust is an entry of judgment. In re Estate of Christensen, 655 P.2d 
646, 648 (1992). Movants waited years before attempting to intervene in this matter, and 
did not attempt to engage the Court or the Fiduciary despite the significant notice 
provided to their community. (See Arizona Attorney General's Resp. to Emergency Mot. 
for Stay of Sales of Trust Property, 4-6.) Nor do Movants provide any justification for 
why they did not seek intervention earlier. Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (1983). The Court should be reticent to allow the Movants to intervene after 
having for years ignored the Court's and the Fiduciary's requests to participate in the 
Trust proceedings. 
c. Movants' claims are barred by laches and equitable estoppel. 
Movants' challenges are barred by laches. See Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah 
Resources Intt, 905 P.2d 312, 314 (1995). In its Decision and Order, the Court stated 
that any attempts to challenge the Court's authority and jurisdiction over the Reformed 
Trust are barred by laches. (Court's November 10, 2008 Decision and Order, 14.) 
6 
Movants' actions demonstrate a lack of diligence and would result in an injury to the 
Trust and community members who have relied on the Fiduciary's administration of the 
Trust for the previous several years. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Ctr. Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1975). 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel operates similar to the doctrine of laches. See 
Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1988). For equitable estoppel 
to apply there must be: (1) a representation, act, or omission, (2) justifiable reliance, and 
(3) a change of position to one's detriment based on that reliance. Id. Movants failed to 
act and the case has proceeded with all involved justifiably relying on the fact that no 
further timely objections to the Trust's reformation existed. The Fiduciary has 
administered the Trust and taken action in reliance on the Trust's reformation. Movants 
are therefore equitably estopped from claiming that the Fiduciary's actions in 
administering the Trust are a violation of their rights. 
d. The Court has agreed to consider Movants' comments on the proposed 
sale of the Berry Knoll Farm and Movants' due process allegations are 
unfounded. 
In its November 10, 2008 Minute Entry, the Court held that "[although the Court 
determined that Movants had no legal standing to challenge the anticipated sale of the 
property -and consistent with past practice - the Court agreed to schedule another 
hearing on the Fiduciary's proposal." (Court's November 10, 2008 Mem. Decision, 1.) 
The Court has agreed to read Movants' comments on the proposed sale and Movants are 
not entitled to any further relief. 
Movants' due process claims are also tenuous and unproven. "To prevail on a due 
process claim, a party must first establish that it has a "'protectible property interest.'" 
Heideman v. Washington City, 155 P.3d 900, 906 (2007). A protectible property interest 
"is an interest in which one has 'a legitimate claim of entitlement.'" Patterson v. Am. 
Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 466 (2003). "It is not an 'abstract need for, or [a] unilateral 
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expectation of, a benefit.'" Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe Council, 226 R3d 1207, 1210 
(2000). "Rather, it is a 'right to a particular decision reached by applying rules to facts.'" 
Fluery v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1231 (1988). At most, Movants are asserting a 
unilateral expectation of a potential benefit and are thus not entitled to due process. As 
potential charitable beneficiaries, Movants do not possess a protectible property interest 
and under the Reformed Trust cannot make a legitimate claim of entitlement. 
Further, Movants cannot claim a realistic deprivation of due process in light of the 
considerable and varied notice provided by the Court and the Fiduciary both before the 
Trust's reformation and during its administration. Movants' due process claims are also 
discredited by the Court's stated willingness to hold a hearing on the sale of the Berry 
Knoll Farm and to consider interested individuals' comments on the Fiduciary's 
disposition of Trust assets worth more than $500,000. 
III. MOVANTS' REQUESTED RELIEF IS PROCEDURALLY UNSOUND 
AND EQUITABLY UNACCEPTABLE. 
a. Movants5 requested relief is not within a Probate Court's jurisdiction 
and the Fiduciary's decision to sale Trust property is reviewable under 
an abuse of discretion standard. 
Movants' claims appear to be at some level a claim of title to the Berry Knoll 
Farm and other Trust property. For example, Movants assert that "[t]he Bishops had had 
specific responsibility for ensuring the proper use and disposition of Trust assets under 
the original Trust, and they maintain that responsibility to the extent they can do so under 
the Reformed Trust." (Mot. to Stay 13.) To the extent Movants are making a claim to 
title on the Berry Knoll Farm or any other Trust property, such claims are not within the 
Court's jurisdiction while sitting in probate. In re Rogers' Estate, 284 P. 992, 997, 75 
Utah 290 (1930). 
In addition, under the Reformed Trust's terms the Fiduciary has the discretion to 
sale property for any legitimate Trust purpose. (Reformed Trust § 5.3.5.) "When a 
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trustee has discretion with respect to the exercise of power, its exercise is subject to 
supervision by a court only to "prevent abuse of discretion." Rest. 3d Trusts § 87 (West 
2007). "What constitutes an abuse of discretion depends on the terms and purposes of the 
trust. . . ." Rest. 3d Trusts § 87, Comment a. (West 2007). "An abuse of discretion may 
result from the exercise of discretionary authority in bad faith or from improper motive. 
Thus, a discretionary power is abused if a trustee acts dishonestly, such as when the 
trustee receives an improper inducement for exercising the power in question." Rest. 3d 
Trusts § 87, Comment c. (West 2007). A court may also intervene "if it finds that the 
trustee's conduct, in exercising a discretionary power, fails to satisfy the applicable 
standard of care, skill, and caution." Id. In this case, the Reformed Trust grants the 
Fiduciary the authority to sale Trust property and the only limitation the Court placed on 
that authority is to require Court approval for the sale of Trust assets worth more than 
$500,000, which the Fiduciary has done with respect to its proposed sale of the Berry 
Knoll Farm. Nothing in the Fiduciary's proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm suggest a 
disregard for the Trust's terms and purposes, or the applicable standard of care, skill, and 
caution required in administering the Trust. 
b. Granting Movants' requested relief is inconsistent with basic principles 
of justice and equity. 
It is "fundamental that equity imperatively demands of suitors in its courts fair 
dealing and righteous conduct with reference to the matters concerning which they seek 
relief." Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 140 (1976). "This fundamental 
principle is expressed in the maxim: 'He who comes into court of equity must come with 
clean hands.5" Id. Movants' Motion touts their participation in the recent settlement 
negotiations, stating "[t]hey have indisputably participated in the settlement discussion in 
good faith." (Mot. to Stay 3.) Movants' Motion, however, fails to mention their failure 
to pay the Court ordered occupancy fees since January 2009. On June 1, 2009, Movants 
and other members of the community paid under protest three months of occupancy fees, 
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alleging that "we should not be required to pay the occupancy fees until Harker Farm 
came back to our control.5' See Exh. 1, Monday, June 15 2009 Press Release. At the time 
of the filing of this Memorandum, Movants still owed an additional three months of 
occupancy fees. 
A Court of equity is also reluctant to reward a party who has been dilatory in 
seeking his remedy, as equity aids the vigilant. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159-
60 (1976). Movants claim to represent the interest of the FLDS Church. Assuming this 
is true, they then must also accept that it was FLDS Church leadership that abandoned 
protection of the Trust requiring the Court to appoint the Fiduciary and reform the Trust. 
(Court's December 13, 2005 Mem. Decision, 10.) Also, FLDS Church leaders have not 
provided the accounting ordered by this Court more than four years ago. {See Court's 
June 22, 2005 Order, 5.) There is little evidence that Movants or other leaders of the 
FLDS Church attempted to cooperate with the Fiduciary in defending the assets of the 
Trust from suit, indeed the FLDS Church and its leaders defaulted on at least two 
lawsuits leaving the Fiduciary to defend the assets of the Trust. (Court's November 10, 
2005 Decision and Order, 13.) Equity is reserved for those who are themselves acting in 
fairness and good conscience. Jacobson, 557 P.2d at 158. It is unfair to allow 
individuals who claim to represent an entity that abandon the Trust and provided little if 
any help to the Fiduciary in protecting the assets of the Trust to reappear and gain 
standing at the eleventh hour for the sole purpose of preventing the Fiduciary's continued 
administration of the Trust. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Movants' Motion to 
intervene, stay this action, and enjoin further action by the Fiduciary. The Court should 
further deny Movants' request to schedule an evidentiary hearing on all pending issues 
including whether the Fiduciary should be removed and replaced. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of June, 2009. 
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Exhibit 1 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Monday, June 1,2009 
HILDALE, UTAH—In compliance with the Court's recent order to the FLDS to 
pay occupancy fees or immediately lose the opportunity to settle, we have tendered 
the required payment of $192,600 to the Utah Attorney General today. 
In February of this year we expressed to the Utah Attorney General our objection 
to the fact that the Fiduciary was receiving payment of his fees twice; first, from 
the occupancy fees of those living on UEP property; and second, by selling the 
milk produced by UEP Harker Dairy. 
The Utah Attorney General agreed that the Fiduciary should get either the occu-
pancy fees or the Harker Farm money and stated that, in his opinion, we should not 
be required to pay the occupancy fees until Harker Farm came back to our control. 
We understand that the Attorney General recommended to the Fiduciary that he 
choose one source of payment or the other. Because the milk proceeds were over 
$100,000 per month, $40,000 a month more than he would receive from the occu-
pancy fees, we understood that the Fiduciary elected to take the milk sale revenue. 
Thus, the profits from the Harker Farm were a substitute for occupancy fees. 
Although we believe the agreement regarding the milk sale revenue satisfied the 
occupancy fee requirement, the FLDS have tendered the $192,600 to the Attorney 
General under protest, because the Court stated that if we do not make that pay-
ment the stay of litigation will be lifted and all the work that has been done to settle 
this case will be lost. The issue that brought this case to the Court was the Attor-
ney General's concern that the assets of the Trust were being wasted. Now the is-
sue has become how to pay over $5 million that has been incurred in administering 
the Trust, while also protecting the land from being sold for non-payment of prop-
erty taxes. We went directly to the Attorney General because of his concern for 
the welfare of the trust. 
As a peaceful people, we believe that settlement is the best way to resolve differ-
ences. Our payment of these funds continues our commitment to work in good 
faith to achieve a settlement of this dispute. 
Further information may be obtained by contacting the following: 
Willie Jessop (435) 467-2416 
Rodney R. Parker (801)521-9000 
